Advances in Collective Decision Making

This book presents research on recent developments in collective decision-making. With contributions from leading scholars from a variety of disciplines, it provides an up-to-date overview of applications in social choice theory, welfare economics, and industrial organization. The contributions address, amongst others, topics such as measuring power, the manipulability of collective decisions, and experimental approaches. Applications range from analysis of the complicated institutional rules of the European Union to responsibility-based allocation of cartel damages or the design of webpage rankings. With its interdisciplinary focus, the book seeks to bridge the gap between different disciplinary approaches by pointing to open questions that can only be resolved through collaborative efforts.

Analyzes collective decision-making in governments, multinational organizations, and firms Provides an overview of applications in social choice theory, welfare economics, and industrial organization Written by leading scholars in the field

Auteur

Sascha Kurz is a professor of mathematics at the University of Bayreuth, Germany. His research interests are in the intersection of mathematics and computer science and comprise the analysis of discrete structures in general. Examples are voting systems and topics from coding theory like divisible codes and network coding.
Nicola Maaser is an associate professor of economics at Aarhus University, Denmark. Her research focuses on collective decision-making and its policy consequences. She approaches questions in this field through theoretical modelling, empirical analysis, and laboratory experiments.

Alexander Mayer is a postdoctoral researcher in economics at the University of Bayreuth, Germany. He is interested in strategic interactions and collective decisions. His research develops and applies theoretical methods of social choice theory and game theory.

Contenu
Chapter 1. Introduction.- Part I. Social Choice.- Chapter 2. Building Bridges over the Great Divide.- Chapter 3. Social Unacceptability for Simple Voting Procedures.- Chapter 4. Probability of Majority Inversion with Three States and Interval Preferences.- Chapter 5. Strategic Voting and Strategic Candidacy.- Chapter 6. Meta-Agreement and Rational Single-Peaked Preferences.- Chapter 7. On the Individual and Coalitional Manipulability of q -Paretian Social Choice Rules.- Part II. Weighted Voting.- Chapter 8. Eectiveness, Decisiveness, and Success in Weighted Voting Systems: Collective Behavior and Voting Measures.- Chapter 9. All Power Structures are Achievable in Basic Weighted Games.- Chapter 10. Bargaining in Legislatures: A New Donation Paradox.- Chapter 11. Egalitarian Collective Decisions as Good Corporate Governance.- Part III. Interpretation and Measurement of Power.- Chapter 12. Liability Situations with Successive Tortfeasors.- Chapter 13. Solidarity and Fair Taxation in TU Games.- Chapter 14. Analyzing the Zerkani Network with the Owen Value.- Chapter 15. The Power of Closeness in a Network.- Chapter 16. Political Power on a Line Graph.- Part IV. EU.- Chapter 17. Double Proportionality for the European Parliament: The Tandem System.- Chapter 18. Explaining Contestation: Votes in the Council of the European Union.- Chapter 19. Codecision in Context Revisited: The Implications of Brexit.- Part V. Field Experiments and Quasi-Experiments.- Chapter 20. Proximity-Based Preferences and Their Implications Based on Data from the Styrian Parliamentary Elections in 2019.- Chapter 21. Participation in Voting over Budget Allocations: A Field Experiment.- Chapter 22. The Oce makes the Politician.