British and American Naval Power

Autorentext

PHILLIPS PAYSON O'BRIEN is a lecturer in Modern History at the University of Glasgow in Scotland. From 1991 until 1996 he was both the Mellon Research Fellow in American History at Cambridge University and a Drapers Research Fellow at Pembroke College, Cambridge.

Klappentext

U.S. and British naval power developed in quite different ways in the early 20th century before the Second World War. This study compares, contrasts, and evaluates both British and American naval power as well as the politics that led to the development of each. Naval power was the single greatest manifestation of national power for both countries. Their armies were small and their air forces only existed for part of the period covered. For Great Britain, naval power was vital to her very existence, and for the U.S., naval power was far and away the most effective tool the country could use to exercise armed influence around the world. Therefore, the decisions made about the relative strengths of the two navies were in many ways the most important strategic choices the British and American governments ever made. An important book for military historians and those interested in the exercise and the extension of power.

Inhalt

Abbreviations Introduction Before the War Naval Policy in Great Britain and the United States British Naval Power from the Two Power Standard to 1908 Theodore Roosevelt and American Naval Power The 1909 Naval Estimates Crisis From Taft to Wilson The Inter-War Years Anglo-American Rivalry and the Paris Peace Conference The Washington Conference and the Question of Naval Parity The Geneva Conference: A Crisis in Anglo-American Relations The Highpoint and Collapse of the Naval Arms Control Process Conclusion Appendix 1 Appendix 2 Bibliography Index