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This book focuses on the Royal Navy's response to the rise of the German navy under Hitler within the broad context of the ongoing debate about Britain's policy of appeasement. It combines a narrative of diplomatic events and Whitehall policy-making with the thematic analysis of naval intelligence and war planning. Drawing on the wide range of sources, the author argues that the Admiralty's enthusiasm for naval armaments diplomacy with Nazi Germany was far more rational and more complex than previous studies would suggest.
Autorentext
JOSEPH A. MAIOLO completed his first degree in history and philosophy at the University of Toronto and graduated with a PhD from the University of London. He has been a Tutorial Fellow in the Department of International History at the London School of Economics and Political Science, and is now a Lecturer in International History at the University of Leeds.
Klappentext
This book focuses on the Royal Navy's response to the rise of the German navy under Hitler within the broad context of the ongoing debate about Britain's policy of appeasement. It combines a narrative of diplomatic events and Whitehall policy-making with the thematic analysis of naval intelligence and war planning. Drawing on the wide range of sources, the author argues that the Admiralty's enthusiasm for naval armaments diplomacy with Nazi Germany was far more rational and more complex than previous studies would suggest.
Zusammenfassung
'Joseph Maiolo's first book is the product of imaginative and diligent archival research, intelligent command of recent revisionist scholarship and robust conceptualisation...Maiolo has come up with a different answer by posing fundamentally different questions.' - Jon Tetsuro Sumida, Military History
'Joe Maiolo's work on Anglo-German naval relations in the late 1930s is a readable and worthwhile addition to the recent literature which, for the last 20 years, has attempted to re-evaluate what exactly Britain's interwar foreign and defence policy really was...Without a doubt the book is well worth the purchase price and should be read by anyone studying British strategic defence policy in the 1930s.' - Greg Kennedy, Diplomacy & Statecraft
'...worthwhile reading for anyone interested in naval and related diplomatic affairs during the interwar period.' - Paul G. Halpern, International Journal of Maritime History
Inhalt
List of Tables and Figures Preface and Acknowledgements Abbreviations Introduction The Naval Staff and the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of June 1935 Anglo-German Naval Relations, June 1935 to July 1937 Naval Staff Perceptions of German Naval Strategy, 1934-39 Admiralty Technical Intelligence and the German Navy, 1936-39 The Naval Staff, British Strategy, and the German Menace, 1934-38 The Naval Staff and Defence and Foreign Policy, 1937-38 The End of Appeasement and the Bid to Transform Admiralty Strategy, 1938-39 Conclusion Notes Bibliography Index