Deterring the Dragon: Returning U.S. Forces to Taiwan

During the Cold War, the primary objective of the U.S. military's conventional deterrence was to prevent a Soviet invasion of Western Europe and most of the literature on conventional deterrence focused on Europe. Since then, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the expansion of the NATO alliance to include many post-Soviet states have dramatically lowered the threat of a conventional invasion of Western Europe. While there remains a risk of fait accompli actions and other malign behavior, the overall risk does not compare with the risk of invasion during the height of the Cold War. Meanwhile, the United States has "pivoted" to Asia and is primarily concerned with an aggressive and "revisionist" People's Republic of China, also called mainland China. China has made it clear that it views the Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as Taiwan) as its most important "core interest" and that it would use force to prevent full Taiwanese independence. The United States needs to recognize that its conventional deterrence against PLA (People's Liberation Army) action to reunify Taiwan may not continue to hold without a change in force posture. Deterrence should always be prioritized over open conflict between peer or near-peer states because of the exorbitant cost of a war between them. If the United States wants to maintain credible conventional deterrence against a PLA attack on Taiwan, it needs to consider basing troops in Taiwan.

Auteur

Capt. Walker D. Mills, U.S. Marine Corps, is an infantry officer serving as an exchange officer with the Colombian Marine Corps.