The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1

The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice provides a comprehensive overview of the research in economics, political science, law, and sociology that has generated considerable insight into the politics of democratic and authoritarian systems as well as the influence of different institutional frameworks on incentives and outcomes. The result is an improved understanding of public policy, public finance, industrial organization, and macroeconomics as the combination of political and economic analysis shed light on how various interests compete both within a given rules of the games and, at times, to change the rules. These volumes include analytical surveys, syntheses, and general overviews of the many subfields of public choice focusing on interesting, important, and at times contentious issues. Throughout the focus is on enhancing understanding how political and economic systems act and interact, and how they might be improved. Both volumes combine methodological analysis with substantive overviews of key topics. This first volume covers voting and elections; interest group competition and rent seeking, including corruption and various normative approaches to evaluating policies and politics. Throughout both volumes important analytical concepts and tools are discussed, including their application to substantive topics. Readers will gain increased understanding of rational choice and its implications for collective action; various explanations of voting, including economic and expressive; the role of taxation and finance in government dynamics; how trust and persuasion influence political outcomes; and how revolution, coups, and authoritarianism can be explained by the same set of analytical tools as enhance understanding of the various forms of democracy.

Auteur

Roger D. Congleton is the BB&T Professor of Economics at West Virginia University. He is coeditor of the journal, Constitutional Political Economy , and has publishing well over a hundred fifty articles on public choice related topics in journals and academic books. Professor Congleton also served as president of the Public Choice Society from March 2018 through March 2020. Bernard Grofman is the Jack W. Peltason Chair of Democracy Studies and Professor of Political Science, University of California, Irvine Stefan Voigt is professor of Law & Economics at the University of Hamburg in Germany. He is best known for his research in constitutional political economy. Together with Roger Congleton, he is editor of the journal, Constitutional Political Economy

Résumé
The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice provides a comprehensive overview of the research in economics, political science, law, and sociology that has generated considerable insight into the politics of democratic and authoritarian systems as well as the influence of different institutional frameworks on incentives and outcomes. The result is an improved understanding of public policy, public finance, industrial organization, and macroeconomics as the combination of political and economic analysis shed light on how various interests compete both within a given rules of the games and, at times, to change the rules. These volumes include analytical surveys, syntheses, and general overviews of the many subfields of public choice focusing on interesting, important, and at times contentious issues. Throughout the focus is on enhancing understanding how political and economic systems act and interact, and how they might be improved. Both volumes combine methodological analysis with substantive overviews of key topics. This first volume covers voting and elections; interest group competition and rent seeking, including corruption and various normative approaches to evaluating policies and politics. Throughout both volumes important analytical concepts and tools are discussed, including their application to substantive topics. Readers will gain increased understanding of rational choice and its implications for collective action; various explanations of voting, including economic and expressive; the role of taxation and finance in government dynamics; how trust and persuasion influence political outcomes; and how revolution, coups, and authoritarianism can be explained by the same set of analytical tools as enhance understanding of the various forms of democracy.

Contenu

PART I: Introductory Essays 1. Rational Choice and Politics: An Introduction to the Research Program and Methodology of Public Choice Roger D. Congleton 2. Choosing among Governments Alan Hamlin 3. Public Choice: Early Contributions Dennis C. Mueller PART II: VOTING AND ELECTIONS A. Modelling Collective Choice in Voting 4. From Paired Comparisons and Cycles to Arrow's Theorem Donald G. Saari 5. Institution-induced Stability Kenneth A. Shepsle 6. Voting Power Stefan Napel 7. Aggregation of Information by Binary Voting Rules Shmuel Nitzan and Jacob Paroush B. Spatial Voting Models 8. Political Choices in One Dimension: Theory Bernard Grofman 9. Political Choices in One Dimension: Applications Bernard Grofman 10. Spatial Voting Models of Party Competition in Two Dimensions James F. Adams 11. Spatial Social Choice Norman Schofield C. Other Aspects of Voter and Party Choice 12. Economic Voting Michael S. Lewis-Beck and Mary Stegmaier 13. Valence Politics Haldun Evrenk 14. The Study of Strategic Voting André Blais and Arianna Degan 15. Turnout: Why do voters vote? Serguei Kaniovski 16. Expressive Voting Alan Hamlin and Colin Jennings 17. Altruism and Political Participation Richard Jankowski 18. Social Embeddedness and Rational Turnout Carole Jean Uhlaner 19. Information cues and rational ignorance Shaun Bowler and Stephen P. Nicholson 20. Manipulation Charles R. Plott D. Democracy in Practice 21. Campaign Finance Thomas Stratmann 22. Primaries, conventions, and other methods for nominating candidates: How do they matter? Gilles Serra 23. Logrolling and Coalitions Anthony J. McGann PART III: INTEREST GROUP POLITICS AND RENT SEEKING A. Interest Group Politics 24. Collective Action Jac C. Heckelman 25. Rent seeking: The social cost of contestable benefits Arye L. Hillman and Ngo Van Long 26. The Structure of Contests and the Extent of Dissipation Karl Wärneryd 27. The Political Economy of Rent Creation and Rent Extraction Roger D. Congleton 28. Empirical evidence on rent seeking costs Ignacio Del Rosal B. Political Agency Problems and Trust in Government 29. 'The Bureaucracy' as an Interest Group Patrick Dunleavy 30. Interest Groups and Regulatory Capture William F. Shughart II and Diana W. Thomas 31. Corruption Toke Aidt 32. The Political Economy of Trust Christian Bjørnskov C. Persuasion 33. Contested Political Persuasion Stergios Skaperdas and Samarth Vaidya 34. Stochastic Process Models of Preference Change Michel Regenwetter and Yung-Fong Hsu 35. Leadership as Persuasion Benjamin E. Hermalin PART IV: NORMATIVE POLITICAL THEORY: EVALUATING POLICIES AND POLITIES 36. Fairness Concepts Christian Klamler 37. Social Contract vs. Invisible Hand: Agreeing to Solve Social Dilemmas Viktor J. Vanberg 38. Utilitarianism as a Criterion for State Action Nicolaus Tideman and Florenz Plassmann 39. Public Choice and Happiness Bruno Frey and Alois Stutzer 40. Kantianism and Political Institutions Geoffrey Brennan and Hartmut Kliemt 41. Public choice and libertarianism Peter J. Boettke and Ennio E. Piano 42. Public choice and social democracy Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard 43. Supreme Values, Totalitarianism and Terrorism Peter Bernholz 44. Fair Division in Dispute Resolution Steven J. Brams 45. Fair Division in Allocating Cabinet Ministries Steven J. Brams