Social Design

This book contains invited essays in memory of Leonid Hurwicz spanning a large area of economic, social and other sciences where the implementation or enforcement of institutions and rules requires the design of effective mechanisms. The foundations of these articles are set by social choice concepts; game theory; Nash, Bayesian and Walrasian equilibria; complete and incomplete information. Besides in-depth treatments of well-established parts of mechanism and implementation theory, contributions on novel directions deal, for instance, with a quantum approach to game and decision making under uncertainty; digitalization; and the design of block chain for trading. The outstanding competence and reputation of the authors reflect the appreciation of the fundamental contributions and the lasting admiration of the personality and the work of Leonid Hurwicz.

Auteur
Walter Trockel graduated in Mathematics (1971) at the University of Bonn (Germany). After he had written his dissertation, supervised by Werner Hildenbrand, during a stay at Berkeley in the group of Gerard Debreu, he received his doctoral degree in Economics (1974) from the University of Bonn. He is a Professor Emeritus at the Center of Mathematical Economics (IMW) of Bielefeld University where he had succeeded Reinhard Selten on his chair in Mathematical Economics in 1985. From 2012 to 2017 he was a professor at the Murat Sertel Center for Advanced Economic Studies at Istanbul Bilgi University. He is a Managing Editor of the Springer Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, and had served in the editorial boards of JME, ET, IGTR, RED and JMID. He is a member of the Advisory Board of RED and a Fellow of the RCGEB at Shandong University, China. Since 2011 he has been a Fellow of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory.

Contenu
Hervé Moulin: Foreword.- Walter Trockel: In Lieu of an Introduction: How I Remember Leonid Hurwicz.- Part I: Institution Design: Thomas Marschak and Dong Wei: Technical Change and the Decentralization Penalty.- Roger B. Myerson: Fundamental Theory of Institutions: a Lecture in Honor of Leo Hurwicz.- Andrew Postlewaite and David Schmeidler: The Hurwicz Program, Past and Suggestions for the Future.- Fernando Vega-Redondo: Social Networks from a Designer's Viewpoint.- Part II: Design Under Uncertainties: Claude d' Aspremont and Jacques Crémer: Some Remarks on Bayesian Mechanism Design.- Leonid Hurwicz, Eric Maskin and Andrew Postelwaite: Feasible Nash Implementation of Social Choice Rules When the Designer Does Not Know Endowments.- John O. Ledyard: Design of Tradable Permit Programs Under Imprecise Measurement.- Tatsuyoshi Saijo: Second Thoughts of Social Dilemma in Mechanism Design.- Part III: Markets: Peter J. Hammond: Allocation Mechanisms, Incentives, and Endemic Institutional Externalities.- Yakar Kannai and Roberto C. Raimondo: The Role of (quasi) Analyticity in Establishing Completeness of Financial Markets Equilibria.- Matthew Van Essen and Mark Walker: Are We There Yet? Mechanism Design Beyond Equilibrium.- Part IV: Rules: Souvik Roy, Soumyarup Sadhukhan and Arunava Sen: Formation of Committees Through Random Voting Rules.- William Thomson: Equal Area Rule to Adjudicate Conflicting Claims.- Part V: Implementation: Bhaskar Dutta: Recent Results on Implementation with Complete Information.- Paul H. Edelman and John A. Weymark: Unrestricted Domain Extensions of Dominant Strategy Implementable Allocation Functions.- Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters: Self-Implementation of Social Choice Correspondences in Strong Equilibrium.- Part VI: New Directions in Design: Salvador Barberà, Dolors Berga and Bernardo Moreno: Domains Admitting ex post Incentive Compatible and Respectful Mechanisms: a Characterization for the Two Alternatives Case.- Gabrielle Demange: Mechanisms in a Digitalized World.- Jonathan Chiu and Thorsten Koeppl: Incentive Compatibility on the Blockchain.- Pierfrancesco La Mura: Contextual Mechanism Design.