Reason and Justice

This is a finely argued, detailed, and comprehensive systematic theory of justice, brilliantly extending Hegelian ethics much as Rawls's Theory of Justice rehabilitated and extended classical Liberalism. Winfield argues that justice, like reason, must be self-grounding, and that to achieve this, it must be self-determined. The theory of justice must therefore abandon its appeal to metaphysically given or transcendentally constituted norms and instead determine the institutions of freedom. In pursuit of this task, Winfield offers insightful discussions of property relations, morality, the family, capital and commodity relations, economic and social justice, and the state. In contrast to Liberalism, which sees the state as instrumental to non-political ends, Winfield defends the democratic state as the just realization of freedom. Throughout, it is argued that justice is defined interactively, where one's freedom is determined by how one's interactions respect and foster the institutional freedom of others.

Although the author's arguments proceed systematically, at each stage he deals adroitly with the relevant major thinkers in the Western tradition-not only with Hegel, but with the ancients, the classical liberals, Marx, and contemporaries such as Rawls.

Auteur

Richard Dien Winfield is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Georgia. He is also the author of The Just Economy.

Contenu

Introduction

1. The Two Traditional Approaches to Justification
   1.1 The Appeal to Privileged Givens
   1.2 The Appeal to a Privileged Determiner

2. The Challenges of Scepticism and Nihilism

3. The Current Impasse in Normative Theory
   3.1 The Rehabilitation of the Foundational Approaches to Justice
   3.2 The Resigned Embrace of Descriptive Theories of Justice

4. The Alternative of a Systematic Philosophy without Foundations

Part I. Dilemmas of the Metaphysical Approach to Truth and Justice

1. Given Determinacy and Justification

1.1 Positive Science and the Problem of the Given
1.2 The Lure of Privileged Givenness and the Path of Metaphysics
1.3 The Problem of Grounding Reason on Privileged Givens
1.3.1 The Lesson of Logical Positivism
1.3.2 The Impossibility of Justifying Any First Principles of Reasoning
1.4 Problems of the Metaphysical Conception of Reality

2. The Metaphysics of Justice

2.1 Plato's Discovery of the Basic Logic of Praxis Theory
2.2 Aristotle's Politics and the Internal Collapse of Praxis Theory
2.2.1 The Good and the Shadow of Relativism
2.2.2 Thje Praxis of Politics and the Appeal to Nature
2.2.2.1 The Genesis of the State and the Relation between Politics and Non-Political Associations
2.2.2.2 The Constitution of the State and Privileged Givenness

Part II. The Critique of the Given and the Appeal to a Privileged Determiner

3. The Futile Temptation of Transcendental Argument

3.1 The Move from the Privileged Givenness to a Privileged Determiner
3.2 The Temptation of the Transcendental Project
3.3 The Fundamental Dilemmas of Transcendental Philosophy
3.4 The Self-Elimination of Transcendental Argument

4. The Justice of Liberty

4.1 From Praxis to Liberty: The Rise of Freedom as the Principle of Justice
4.1.1 Freedom and the Validity of Justice
4.1.2 The Basic Dilemma of Liberal Theory
4.1.3 The Universal, Particular, and Individual Dimensions of Willing
4.2 The Logic of Liberty and the Paradoxes of Social Contract
4.2.1 The Natural Will and the State of Nature
4.2.2 The Perplexities of Social Contract

5. The Promise and Illusion of Practical Reason

5.1 Practical Reason and the Individuality of Freedom
5.2 The Impracticality of Practical Reason
5.3 Civil Society in the Service of Practical Reason
5.4 The Miscarriage of Rawls' Rehabilitation of Social Contract Theory
5.4.1 The Hidden Assumptions of Pure Procedural Justice
5.4.2 The Collapse of Rawls' Derivation of the Two Principles of Justice
5.4.3 The Incoherence of the Move to the Original Position

Part III. Freedom from Foundations and the Validity of Self-Determination

6. Self-Determination and Systematic Philosophy

6.1 The Perplexity of Abandoning the Appeal to Privileged Givens and Privileged Determiners
6.1.1 The Futile Route of Holism
6.2 Indeterminacy, Self-Determination, and Freedom from Foundations
6.2.1 Self-Determination as Immanent Development from Indeterminacy
6.2.2 The Advance from Indeterminacy as Self-Determination
6.3 Moving from Indeterminacy to Determinacy without Foundations

7. The Theory of Determinacy and the Quests for Truth and Justice

7.1.1 The Theory of Determinacy as a Science of Logic
7.1.2 The Argument of the Theory of Determinacy
7.1.3 Systematic Philosophy versus Coherence Theories of Truth
7.1.4 The Limit of the Theory of Determinacy
7.2 The Move from the Theory of Determinacy to the Theory of Reality
7.2.1 The Dogma of Realism and Idealism
7.2.2 Beyond Realism and Idealism
7.3 Normativity, Rational Reconstruction, and the Theory of Justice
7.3.1 Freedom as Nor