PLA Influence on China's National Security Policymaking

In recent years there have been reports of actions purportedly taken by People's Liberation Army (PLA) units without civilian authorization, and of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) civilian leaders seeking to curry favor with the military-suggesting that a nationalistic and increasingly influential PLA is driving more assertive Chinese policies on a range of military and sovereignty issues. To many experienced PLA watchers, however, the PLA remains a "party-army" that is responsive to orders from the CCP.

PLA Influence on China's National Security Policymaking seeks to assess the "real" relationship between the PLA and its civilian masters by moving beyond media and pundit speculation to mount an in-depth examination and explanation of the PLA's role in national security policymaking. After examining the structural factors that shape PLA interactions with the Party-State, the book uses case studies to explore the PLA's role in foreign policy crises. It then assesses the PLA's role in China's territorial disputes and in military interactions with civilian government and business, exploring the military's role in China's civil-military integration development strategy. The evidence reveals that today's PLA does appear to have more influence on purely military issues than in the past-but much less influence on political issues-and to be more actively engaged in policy debates on mixed civil-military issues where military equities are at stake.

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Edited by Phillip C. Saunders and Andrew Scobell

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Contents and AbstractsIntroduction: PLA Influence on Chinese National Security Policymaking chapter abstractThe Introduction examines four trends that have reshaped civil-military relations in China and affected the role of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in policymaking. It presents two analytic approaches-one focused on the nature of the issue under consideration, where decisions on that issue are made within the Chinese system, and what role the PLA plays in those decisions, and one focused on the PLA's ability to exert influence at different stages in the policymaking process. After brief chapter summaries, the Introduction presents ten findings, concluding that civilian Communist Party leaders remain in control of the military, but that over the last two decades the PLA appears to have more influence on purely military issues, much less influence on political issues, and to be more actively engaged in policy debates on mixed civil-military issues where military equities are at stake. 1Reconsidering the PLA as an Interest Group chapter abstract In this chapter Isaac Kardon and Phillip Saunders examine whether the PLA can be thought of as an interest group, finding that factors which previously limited the PLA's ability to act as a coherent policy actor have diminished. Today's PLA demonstrates numerous characteristics of an interest group, including professionalization, growing coherence of its corporate interests, an expanding monopoly on national security expertise and information, and enhanced capacity to articulate and defend institutional goals and equities in order to shape public debate and influence policy. 2The PLA in the Party Leadership Decisionmaking System chapter abstract In this chapter Alice Miller explains the political logic behind the transformation of the Chinese leadership's decisionmaking system, emphasizing a deliberate effort by Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s to establish an effective collective leadership system with checks and balances to prevent attempts by any individual member-and especially by the party general secretary-to dominate the others. She argues that these reforms have transformed civil-military relations from "subjective civilian control" to "objective civilian control" as the PLA's influence on political decisions has narrowed into institutional mechanisms focused on security issues. These structural changes limit the ability of PLA leaders to exert influence on political issues or to exploit potential splits among top civilian leaders. 3The Riddle in the Middle: China's Central Military Commission in the Twenty-first Century chapter abstract In this chapter Tai Ming Cheung uses new sources to describe the inner workings of the secretive Central Military Commission (CMC). He identifies key political and organizational principles guiding the CMC's development; describes its current structure, workings, and responsibilities; highlights the critical role played by the CMC vice-chairmen; evaluates Hu Jintao's role as CMC chairman and problems in civil-military relations during his tenure; and conducts an initial assessment of Xi Jinping's early tenure as CMC chairman. Cheung stresses Xi's emphasis on the role of military power in a "strong China dream," efforts to impose stricter political and fiscal discipline, and decision to restructure the military command system to improve its ability to conduct joint operations. 4Top Leaders and the PLA: The Different Styles of Jiang, Hu, and Xi chapter abstract Nan Li's chapter assesses how Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao exerted influence over the PLA, and analyzes why their methods differed. He distinguishes between two approaches: "currying favor" by catering to PLA interests and "imposing will" by forcing the PLA to do things it would not otherwise want to do. He argues that Jiang curried favor early in his leadership and then imposed his will, while Hu curried favor throughout his tenure. Nan Li suggests Xi Jinping is likely to curry favor initially to consolidate power, but then to impose his will by downsizing and reorganizing the military. 5The PLA Role in China's Foreign Policy and Crisis Behavior chapter abstract Michael Swaine assesses the limited information about the PLA's role in China's foreign policy and political-military crisis behavior. He begins by examining the changing relationship of the PLA to the overall PRC political power structure and then reviews the PLA's role in foreign policy, looking at both senior-level and operational-level interactions. He examines five aspects of the PLA's role in crisis decisionmaking and implementation: upper-level participants and processes, lower-level actors, intelligence and information flows and preexisting plans, research institutes, and unplanned or uncontrolled behavior. Swaine challenges the view of a PLA that wields a decisive influence, noting that the PLA's strongest avenue for influence is through the Central Military Commission (CMC). Lack of an effective NSC-like structure raises doubts about adequate coordination and oversight of PLA operational activities such as weapons testing and military actions outside China's borders. 6The PLA Role in China's Taiwan Policymaking chapter abstract Bonnie Glaser assesses the extent of the PLA's influence on the PRC's cross-Strait policy and the avenues the PLA uses to influence that policy. Acknowledging the difficulty in judging whether the PLA's attempts to exert influence are successful, Glaser identifies ten methods the PLA uses to shape Taiwan policy. These include using its institutional representation in the CMC and other policy bodies, intelligence and research, military procurement, military exercises, official statements, defense white papers and other official documents, media exposure, informal mechanisms, cultural and social exchanges, and military-to-military channels with third-party countries. Glaser suggests that the CMC is the most important avenue by which the PLA attempts to influence China's Taiwan policy, with intelligence and research and defense white papers being the next most effective avenues. 7The PLA Role in China's DPRK Policy chapter abstract Andrew Scobell addresses the PLA's decisionmaking role on Korea issues by analyzing the 2002-2003 "second nuclear crisis" and the 2010 ROK Navy Cheonan crisis. Scobell argues that Chinese leaders place a high priority on stability, view the DPRK as vo…