Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective

Science and its philosophical companion, Naturalism, represent reality in wholly nonpersonal terms. How, if at all, can a nonpersonal scheme accommodate the first-person perspective that we all enjoy? In this volume, Lynne Rudder Baker explores that question by considering both reductive and eliminative approaches to the first-person perspective. After finding both approaches wanting, she mounts an original constructive argument to show that a non-Cartesian first-person perspective belongs in the basic inventory of what exists. That is, the world that contains us persons is irreducibly personal. After arguing for the irreducibilty and ineliminability of the first-person perspective, Baker develops a theory of this perspective. The first-person perspective has two stages, rudimentary and robust. Human infants and nonhuman animals with consciousness and intentionality have rudimentary first-person perspectives. In learning a language, a person acquires a robust first-person perspective: the capacity to conceive of oneself as oneself, in the first person. By developing an account of personal identity, Baker argues that her theory is coherent, and she shows various ways in which first-person perspectives contribute to reality.

Auteur

Lynne Rudder Baker is Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, University of Massachusetts Amherst. Baker has written four books on metaphysics and the philosophy of mind, and has published many articles in philosophy journals such as The Journal of Philosophy, The Philosophical Review, Philosophical Studies, Noûs, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research and many more.

Contenu

Introduction: What is the Problem? The Claim of Naturalism A Challenge to Naturalism What is at Stake An Overview Part I: The Core Argument Chapter 1. Varieties of Naturalism What Counts As 'Science'? Reductive Naturalism Nonreductive Naturalism Disenchantment and Optimism Chapter 2. On Naturalizing the First-Person Perspective What is Naturalization? The Robust First-Person Perspective The Rudimentary First-Person Perspective Chapter 3. Reductive Approaches to the First-Person Perspective John Perry on an Epistemic Account of the Self David Lewis on De Se Belief A Comment on John Searle Can Cognitive Science Save the Day? Chapter 4. Eliminative Approaches to the First-Person Perspective Daniel Dennett on Consciousness Thomas Metzinger on a Self-Model Theory My Recommendation Chapter 5. Arguments Against First-Person Naturalization From First-Person Concepts to First-Person Properties A Linguistic Argument: A Complete Ontology Must Include First-Person Properties A Metaphysical Argument Against Ontological Naturalism Part II: An Account of the First-Person Perspective Chapter 6. From the Rudimentary to the Robust Stage of the First-Person Perspective The First-Person Perspective: Consciousness and Self-Consciousness Language and the Acquisition of Concepts How to Acquire a Self-Concept Human Persons: Wrap Up Chapter 7. Is the Idea of the First-Person Perspective Coherent? Personal Identity: A First-Personal Approach Objections and Replies Mark Johnston on the Self as Illusory Johnston's Critique Side-Stepped Chapter 8. A Metaphysical Framework for The First-Person Perspective First-Person Properties Dispositional Properties Haecceitistic Implications Chapter 9. Agents, Artifacts, Moral Responsibility: Some Contributions of the First-person Perspective Personhood Agency Artifacts Moral Responsibility Chapter 10. Natural Reality Near-Naturalism Property-Constitution and Causation Emergentism and Downward Causation How Naturalistic is Near-Naturalism? Index