Kai Draper begins his book with the assumption that individual rights exist and stand as moral obstacles to the pursuit of national no less than personal interests. That assumption might seem to demand a pacifist rejection of war, for any sustained war effort requires military operations that predictably kill many noncombatants as "collateral damage," and presumably at least most noncombatants have a right not to be killed. Yet Draper ends with the conclusion that sometimes recourse to war is justified. In making his argument, he relies on the insights of John Locke to develop and defend a framework of rights to serve as the foundation for a new just war theory. Notably missing from that framework is any doctrine of double effect. Most just war theorists rely on that doctrine to justify injuring and killing innocent bystanders, but Draper argues that various prominent formulations of the doctrine are either untenable or irrelevant to the ethics of war. Ultimately he offers a single principle for assessing whether recourse to war would be justified. He also explores in some detail the issue of how to distinguish discriminate from indiscriminate violence in war, arguing that some but not all noncombatants are liable to attack.

Auteur

Kai Draper is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Delaware. He writes on the significance of death, the ethics of self-defense and war, and the nature of evidence. His work has appeared in the Philosophical Review, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Philosophical Studies, Nous, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, and other leading philosophical journals.

Contenu

Acknowledgments Chapter 1: Introduction 1.1: Overview 1.2: Individualism vs. collectivism 1.3: Methodology 1.4: The existence of moral rights 1.5: Terminology Chapter 2: A Lockean Framework of Rights 2.1: The right to one's own person 2.2: Property rights and rights of first arrival 2.3: Negative need rights 2.4: Autonomy, well-being, and rights Chapter 3: Rights and Harm 3.1: The doctrine of doing and allowing 3.2: Quinn's interpretation of the doctrine 3.3: Foot's interpretation of the doctrine 3.4: The causal interpretation of the doctrine 3.5: The acting-on interpretation of the doctrine 3.6: A rights-based alternative 3.7: Three objections 3.8: Rights and intentions Chapter 4: Liability to Defense 4.1: The rights enforcement account 4.2: Defense against the innocent 4.3: Defense of the guilty 4.4: The defense liability principle 4.5: Forfeiture 4.6: Montague and McMahan Chapter 5: Necessity and Proportionality in Defense 5.1: A defense of internalism 5.2: Necessary harm 5.3: Proportionate harm 5.4: Do the numbers count? Chapter 6: Liberating Just War Theory from Double Effect 6.1: The structure of my argument 6.2: PDE, MP and rights 6.3: Quinn's defense of double effect 6.4: Recent attempts to improve upon Quinn 6.5: The restricted claims principle 6.6: Alleged support for a strongly discriminating principle 6.7: The irrelevance of weakly discriminating principles Chapter 7: The Rights of Innocent Bystanders 7.1: Unauthorized violence 7.2: Excusable violence 7.3: Liability through assumed risk 7.4: Ex ante compensation 7.5: Justifiable infringements upon rights Chapter 8: How to Justify Waging War 8.1: The justifiable war principle 8.2: Is the justifiable war principle too demanding? 8.3: The flaws of traditional jus ad bellum Chapter 9: The Scope of Liability in War 9.1: Combatants and military personnel 9.2: Those who assist unjust aggressors 9.3: Munitions workers 9.4: Farmers and taxpayers Chapter 10: Citizenship and Liability 10.1: Agency and liability 10.2: Nonintervention and liability Chapter 11: Conclusions Appendix: Need Rights and Compensation Index