Autonomy is the central idea of modern practical philosophy. Understood as self-legislation, autonomy seems to require that the validity of norms depends on recognition, namely, that their addressees, being autonomous agents, recognise these norms to be valid. But how can one be bound by norms whose validity depends on their being recognised as valid by their addressees? The questions of how autonomous morality and, on this basis, the authoritative character of law can be understood, present persistent puzzles that have been widely discussed, but still await a satisfactory solution.
This book presents an analysis of the idea of autonomy as self-legislation and its consequences for law and morality. It links the idea of autonomy with the idea of the balancing of normative arguments, develops a notion of normative arguments as distinct from normative judgements and statements and explains claims to correctness and objectivity that are found in normative discourse. Thus, a 'logic of autonomy' emerges, and it is pervasive in normative reasoning. It connects theses regarding the logic of norms, the structure of balancing, human and fundamental rights, legal validity, legal interpretation, and the relations among legal systems, offering a theory of central elements of normative argumentation, a theory that is undergirded by the mutual relations that exist between and among its parts as well as through the relations that it bears to other theories. Moreover, it offers an alternative to Kantian notions of autonomy and provides solutions to problems that other theories have failed to master.

Auteur

Jan-R Sieckmann is Professor of Public Law in the Faculty of Business, Economics and Law of the Friedrich-Alexander-University Erlangen-Nürnberg, Germany.

Contenu

1 The Idea of Autonomy
1.1 The Paradox of Autonomy
1.2 Autonomy and Authority
1.3 The Logic of Autonomy
1.4 Central Issues in a Theory of Autonomous Reasoning
2 Normative Language
2.1 A Framework for Autonomous Reasoning
2.2 Norms, Normative Arguments, Judgements and Statements
2.3 The Non-Propositionality Thesis
2.4 The Logic of Normative Argument
2.5 Conclusion
3 The Concept of Normative Arguments
3.1 Structure of Normative Arguments
3.2 Argument for the Reiteration of Requirements for Validity
3.3 Objections and Problems
3.4 Conclusion
4 The Justification of Norms
4.1 Structure of Normative Justification
4.2 Procedural Elements of Normative Justification
4.3 Substantive Elements of Normative Justification
4.4 Conclusion
5 Autonomous Balancing
5.1 Conceptions of Balancing
5.2 The Model of Optimisation
5.3 Criteria of Balancing
5.4 The Indeterminacy of Balancing
5.5 Conclusion
6 Claims to Correctness, Validity and Objectivity
6.1 Claims to Correctness
6.2 Claim to Correctness of Autonomous Judgements
6.3 Claims to Definitive Validity
6.4 Claims to Objective Validity
6.5 Conclusion
7 Rights
7.1 The Structure of Rights
7.2 A System of Rights
7.3 The Balancing of Rights
7.4. Conclusion
8 Autonomy Rights, Human Rights and Fundamental Rights
8.1 The Idea of Universal Rights
8.2 Justification of Human Rights
8.3 Fundamental Rights
8.4 Conclusion
9 Legal Validity
9.1 Law as a Binding Public Order
9.2 Conceptions of Legal Validity
9.3 Authoritative Character of Law
9.4 Legal and Moral Validity
9.5 Conclusion
10 Legal Interpretation and Autonomous Reasoning
10.1 Balancing, Interpretation and the Authoritative Structure of Law
10.2 Concept of Interpretation
10.3 Structure of Legal Interpretation
10.4 Competence and Legal Interpretation
10.5 Conclusion
11 The Autonomy of Legal Systems
11.1 Concept of a Legal System
11.2 Types of Intersystemic Relation
11.3 Definitions and General Theses
12 Conclusion
Appendix: Symbols, Key Notions and Rules of Argumentation