In this study two strands of inferentialism are brought together: the philosophical doctrine of Brandom, according to which meanings are generally inferential roles, and the logical doctrine prioritizing proof-theory over model theory and approaching meaning in logical, especially proof-theoretical terms.

Auteur
Jaroslav Peregrin is Head of the Department of Logic at the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic and Professor at the Faculty of Arts and Philosophy of the University of Hradec Králové. His research is located at the intersection of logic, analytic philosophy, and semantics; he is the author of Doing Worlds with Words (1995) and Meaning and Structure (2001).

Contenu
Acknowledgements 1. Inferentialism: State of Play PART I: LANGUAGE, MEANING AND NORMS 2. Words as Governed by Rules 3. Meanings as Inferential Roles 4. The Rules of Language 5. Our Language Games 6. Rules and Evolution PART II: LOGIC, INFERENCE AND REASONING 7. Inference in Logic 8. Logical Constants 9. Logic as Making Inference Explicit 10. Rules of Logic 11. Logic and Reasoning Postscript: Inferentialism on the Go Appendix: Proofs of Theorems Notes References Index