In this book, the author provides an account of three central ideas in the philosophy of action: trying to act, acting or doing, and one's action causing further consequences. In all three cases, novel theories of these phenomena are offered: trying to act is not a particular mental or physical act but can be explained using conditionals; that action is not the same as causing something to happen; and in the case of a special but important subset of actions, for example the opening of a window, the action is identical to the event of the window's opening. A result of this last account is that it places actions out in the world, sometimes far removed in time and space from the actor's body. The world is full of action; actions do not just exist in the many little islands of space and time that all of our bodies inhabit. In the final chapter, Ruben describes and discusses a skeptical challenge to the idea that we can ever know whether or not someone else has acted, rather than just passive events having happened to that person.

Auteur

David-Hillel Ruben is Professor Emeritus at the University of London, UK, and Honorary Research Fellow at Birkbeck, University of London. Having previously worked at the University of Edinburgh, University of Glasgow, Essex University, City University, London School of Economics, his past publications include The Metaphysics of the Social World (1985), Explaining Explanation (1992 and 2012) and Action and Its Explanation (2003).

Contenu

Introduction2. The Physical Action Theory of Trying3. Trying in Some Way4. A Conditional Theory of Trying5. Causing and Doing6. Doing and Causing7. Causing in Some Way8. Regress Issues and Action Scepticism.