This study sheds light on the efficiency of corporate control allocation in Chinese listed firms. Using a panel data set for the period 1996 to 2006, it examines the frequency, causes and consequences of changes in corporate control. The results indicate that poorly performing firms are the predominant targets of control changes; shareholder and creditor control generally act as a complement for changes in control. Following the change in ownership there is a substantial amount of corporate restructuring and an improvement in operating performance. Significant differences in these dimensions emerge, however, between State and private transfers of control. The findings not only provide insights into the motives and constraints of the key players involved in governance practices in China; but they also contain useful implications for other emerging markets around the world that have weak legal systems and weak property rights protection.

Résumé
The completion of this research would not have been possible without the generous support of many individuals and institutions. These are specific obligations which I wish to acknowledge here. I would like to express my gratitude to my thesis supervisors. I am highly indebted to Professor Franz Waldenberger for his invaluable help and - couragement from the very beginning of this research project. Not only this research but I personally greatly benefited from his guidance and - pervision over the years. I am also indebted to Professor Ralf Elsas for his support and detailed comments which significantly improved this research. At the University of Munich, I would further like to thank Professor Joachim Winter and Dr. Florian Heiss for their patience and effort in - creasing my understanding of the econometric methods used in this study. Perhaps even more important I am indebted to them because of their c- tribution in shaping my fascination about micro-econometrics in general.

Contenu
China's reform process, stock market development, and testable hypotheses.- Data, concept of control, and summary statistics on changes in control.- Causes of changes in ultimate share ownership.- Consequences of changes in ultimate share ownership.- Conclusion.