The fight between North and South over intellectual property (IP) reached new heights in the 1990s. In one corner, large multinational companies and developed countries sought to protect their investments. Opposing them, developing countries argued for the time and scope to pursue development strategies unshackled by rules forged to bolster the competitiveness of richer countries. The result was the WTO's deeply contested Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects ofIntellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Widely resented by developing countries, TRIPS nonetheless permits them some hard-won flexibility. Puzzling, however, is why some developing countries have used that flexibility and others have not. Even more curious is that many of the poorest countries have made leastuse of the room for manouevre, despite securing some extra concessions. For developing countries, TRIPS did not end the pro-IP offensive. At the urging of industry lobbyists, powerful countries backtracked on the flexibilities in TRIPS and pursued even stronger global IP rules. To prevent precedents for weaker IP standards in poorer countries, they issued threats to market access, aid, investment, and political alliances. Further, they used new trade deals and, more subtly, capacity building (assisted by the World Intellectual Property Organization, among others)to leverage faster compliance and higher standards than TRIPS requires. Meanwhile, 'pro-development' advocates from civil society, other UN agencies, and developingcountries worked to counter 'compliance-plus' pressures and defend the use of TRIPS flexibilities, sometimes with success. Within developing countries, most governments had little experience of IP laws and deferred TRIPS implementation to IP offices cut-off from trade politics and national policymaking, making them more vulnerable to the TRIPS-plus agenda. In many of the poorest Africancountries, regional IP arrangements magnified this effect. For scholars of international political economy and law, this book is the first detailed exploration of the links between global IP politics and the implementation of IP reforms. It exposes how power politics occur not just within global trade talks but afterwards when countries implement agreements. The Implementation Game will be of interest to all those engaged in debates on the global governance oftrade and IP

Résumé
With the launch of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, its Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) emerged as a symbol of coercion in international economic relations. In the decade that followed, intellectual property became one of the most contentious topics of global policy debate. This book is the first full-length study of the politics surrounding what developing countries did to implement TRIPS and why. Based on a review of the evidence from 1995 to 2007, this book emphasises that developing countries exhibited considerable variation in their approach to TRIPS implementation. In particular, developing countries took varying degrees of advantage of the legal safeguards and options-commonly known as TRIPS 'flexibilities'-that the Agreement provides. To explain this variation, this book argues that TRIPS implementation must be understood as a complex political game played out among developing country governments and a range of stakeholders-developed countries, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), intergovernmental organisations (IGOs), and industry groups. The contested nature of the TRIPS bargain spurred competing efforts to revise the terms of TRIPS and to influence global IP regulation more broadly. The intensity of the implementationgame was amplified by an awareness among the various stakeholders that the IP reforms developing countries pursued would influence these ongoing international negotiations. The book attributes the variation in TRIPS implementation to the interplay between these global IP debates, international powerpressures, and political dynamics within developing countries. The book includes historical analysis, compilations of evidence, and analysis supported by examples from across the developing world. The Implementation Game will be of interest both to scholars of international relations, law, and international political economy as well as to policymakers, commentators, and activists engaged in debates on the global governance of intellectual property.