This book presents an in-depth and critical reconstruction of Prawitz's epistemic grounding, and discusses it within the broader field of proof-theoretic semantics. The theory of grounds is also provided with a formal framework, through which several relevant results are proved. Investigating Prawitz's theory of grounds, this work answers one of the most fundamental questions in logic: why and how do some inferences have the epistemic power to compel us to accept their conclusion, if we have accepted their premises? Prawitz proposes an innovative description of inferential acts, as applications of constructive operations on grounds for the premises, yielding a ground for the conclusion. The book is divided into three parts. In the first, the author discusses the reasons that have led Prawitz to abandon his previous semantics of valid arguments and proofs. The second part presents Prawitz's grounding as found in his ground-theoretic papers. Finally, in the third part, a formal apparatus is developed, consisting of a class of languages whose terms are equipped with denotation functions associating them to operations and grounds, as well as of a class of systems where important properties of the terms can be proved.

Auteur

I obtained my Bachelor Degree in Philosophy at the "Federico II" University of Naples in 2009, and my Master Degree in Philosophy at the "La Sapienza" University of Rome in 2014. I achieved the Doctoral Degree in Philosophy in 2019, with a dissertation about Dag Prawitz's theory of grounds under the conjoint direction of prof. Gabriella Crocco (Aix-Marseille University) and prof. Cesare Cozzo ("La Sapienza" University of Rome). I am currently teaching History and Philosophy of Science, Logic and Philosophy of Logic, and Philosophy of Mathematics, at the Science and Philosophy Departments of the Aix-Marseille University. Broadly, I deal with mathematical logic and philosophy of logic. More specifically, I am interested into constructive logics and proof-theoretic semantics (particularly Prawitz's semantics) stemming from the intuitionistic tradition. As a parallel project, I investigate whether Kreisel's informal rigour and Goedel's absolute provability can be read through the lens of contemporary constructivist approaches. A minor interest concerns a socio-epistemological study of scientific controversies.