On Evidence in Philosophy

William G. Lycan offers an epistemology of philosophy itself, a partial method for philosophical inquiry. In sum, he advocates a picture of philosophy as a very wide explanatory reflective equilibrium incorporating common sense, science, and our firmest intuitions on any topic.

William G. Lycan has written a short but action-packed book about why philosophical arguments don't establish skeptical or radically revisionary claims concerning the nature of reality or our capacities as knowers and agents. A terrific volume, it is sure to annoy or maybe even infuriate many philosophers who think highly of their own arguments. . . . Here is a philosopher who is deeply reflective, self-critical, and able to impart insights with concision and wit. I recommend the book to all philosophers interested in methodology, skepticism, and knowledge.

Auteur
William G. Lycan is William Rand Kenan, Jr. Professor of Philosophy Emeritus at the University of North Carolina and currently Distinguished Visiting Professor at the University of Connecticut. He is author of Logical Form in Natural Language (1984), Knowing Who (with Steven Boër, 1986), Consciousness (1987), Judgement and Justification (1988), Modality and Meaning (1994), Consciousness and Experience (1996), Philosophy of Language: A Contemporary Introduction (Routledge 1999), and Real Conditionals (Oxford 2001).

Contenu

• Introduction

• 1: A Version of Moore's Method

• 2: Moore against the New Skeptics

• 3: A Novel Refutation of Eliminative Materialism

• 4: Free Will and the Burden of Proof

• 5: The Poverty of Philosophical Method (a Case Study)

• 6: Philosophical Knowledge

• 7: The Evidential Status of Intuitions

• 8: Intuitions and Coherentism

• Conclusion