Perception: First Form of Mind

Auteur
Tyler Burge is Flint Professor of Philosophy, UCLA, where has taught since 1971. He has held visiting positions at Harvard, MIT, Stanford, Munich, Bayreuth, Bologna, and Zurich. He has delivered numerous named lecture series, including the Locke Lectures, Dewey Lectures, Whitehead Lectures, Kant Lectures, Petrus Hispanus Lectures, and Nicod Lectures. His work has made contributions to philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychologyepistemology, philosophy of language, philosophy of logic, and the history of philosophy. He has published four books with OUP: Origins of Objectivity (2010) and three volumes of essays, Truth, Thought, Reason (2005), Foundations of Mind (2007), and Cognition through Understanding (2013).

Texte du rabat

Tyler Burge offers an agenda-setting, scientifically rigorous account of the most primitive form of representational mind: perception. He explains how perception works and how it relates to other mental capacities--conation, attention, memory, anticipation, affect, learning, imagining--and clarifies the distinction between perceiving and thinking.

Résumé
In Perception: First Form of Mind, Tyler Burge develops an understanding of the most primitive type of mental representational: perception. Focusing on the functions and capacities of perceptual states, Burge accounts for their representational content and structure, and develops a formal semantics for them. The discussion explains the role of iconic format in the structure. It also situates the accounts of content, structure, and semantics within scientific explanations of perceptual-state formation, emphasizing formation of perceptual categorization. In the book's second half, Burge discusses what a perceptual system is. Exploration of relations between perception and other primitive capacities-conation, attention, memory, anticipation, affect, learning, and imagining-helps distinguish perceiving, with its associated capacities, from thinking, with its associated capacities. Drawing mainly on vision science, not introspection, Perception: First Form of Mind is a rigorous, agenda-setting work in philosophy of perception and philosophy of science.

Contenu

• Preface

• Part I: Perception

• 1: Introduction

• 2: Perception

• 3: Perceptual Constancy: A Central Psychological Natural Kind

• Part II: Form

• 4: Some Basics about Perception and Perceptual Systems

• 5: Perceptual Reference Requires Perceptual Attribution

• 6: Form and Semantics of Perceptual Representational Contents

• 7: Perceptual Attributives and Referential Applications in Perceptual Constancies

• 8: Egocentric Indexing in Perceptual Spatial and Temporal Frameworks

• 9: The Iconic Nature of Perception

• Part III: Formation

• 10: First-formed Perception

• 11: Intra-saccadic Perception and Recurrent Processing

• 12: Further Attributives: Primitive Attribution of Causation, Agency

• Part IV: System

• 13: Perceptual-level Representation and Categorization

• 14: Perceptual-level Conation and Relatively Primitive, Perceptually Guided Action

• 15: Perceptual Attention

• 16: Perceptual Memory I: Shorter Term Systems

• 17: Perceptual Memory II: Visual Perceptual Long-Term Memory

• 18: Perceptual Learning, Perceptual Anticipation, Perceptual Imagining

• 19: Perception and Cognition

• 20: Conclusion