Principled Agents?

Zusatztext 'Tim Besley demonstrates how to analyze political agency in the intellectual middle ground left open in between the optimism of the traditional welfare-economics approach! and the pessimism of the traditional public-choice approach. The key to good government is institution design- in the best Federalist tradition- to improve incentives in policymaking and selection to public office. Quite simply! a great book by a great economist.' Informationen zum Autor Timothy Besley is Professor of Economics at the LSE and Director of the Suntory Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines (STICERD) at the LSE. He is also a Research Fellow at the Institute for Fiscal Studies and the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR). He has acted as Co-Editor of the American Economic Review and Managing Editor of the Economic Journal. He is an elected member of the Council of the Royal Economic Society, theEconometric Society, and the European Economics Association. Klappentext What is good government? Why do some governments fail? How do you implement political accountability in practice? What incentives do you need to put in place to ensure that politicians and public servants act in the public interest and not their own? These questions and many more are addressed in Timothy Besley's intriguing Lindahl lectures. Zusammenfassung What is good government? Why do some governments fail? How do you implement political accountability in practice? What incentives do you need to put in place to ensure that politicians and public servants act in the public interest and not their own? These questions and many more are addressed in Timothy Besley's intriguing Lindahl lectures. Inhaltsverzeichnis 1 COMPETING VIEWS OF GOVERNMENT ; The issues ; This book ; Background ; Economic Policy Making ; Political Economy ; Incentives and Selection in Politics ; Concluding Comments ; 2 THE ANATOMY OF GOVERNMENT FAILURE ; Introduction ; Three Notions of Government Failure ; The Basic Model ; Government Failure ; Democratic Political Failures ; A Dynamic Model ; Government Failure in the Dynamic Model ; Responses to Political Failure ; Concluding Comments ; 3 POLITICAL AGENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY ; Introduction ; Elements of Political Agency Models ; The Baseline Model ; Extensions ; Discussion ; Concluding Comments ; 4 POLITICAL AGENCY AND PUBLIC FINANCE ; Introduction ; The Model ; Three Scenarios ; Implications ; Restraining Government ; Debt and Deficits ; Governments versus NGOs ; Competence ; Conclusions ...

Auteur

Timothy Besley is Professor of Economics at the LSE and Director of the Suntory Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines (STICERD) at the LSE. He is also a Research Fellow at the Institute for Fiscal Studies and the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR). He has acted as Co-Editor of the American Economic Review and Managing Editor of the Economic Journal. He is an elected member of the Council of the Royal Economic Society, the Econometric Society, and the European Economics Association.

Texte du rabat

What is good government? Why do some governments fail? How do you implement political accountability in practice? What incentives do you need to put in place to ensure that politicians and public servants act in the public interest and not their own? These questions and many more are addressed in Timothy Besley's intriguing Lindahl lectures.

Résumé
What is good government? Why do some governments fail ? How do you implement political accountability in practice? What incentives do you need to put in place to ensure that politicians and public servants act in the public interest and not their own? These questions and many more are addressed in Timothy Besley's intriguing Lindahl lectures. Economic analyses of government usually divide into two broad camps. One which emphasizes government as a force for public good that can regulate markets, distribute resources and generally work towards improving the lives of its citizens. The other sees government as driven by private interests, susceptible to those with the power to influence its decisions and failing to incentivize its officials to act for the greater public good. This book adopts a middle way between the two extremes, the Publius approach, which recognizes the potential for government to act for the public good but also accepts the fact that things often go wrong. It shares the view that there are certain institutional preconditions for effective government but then proceed to examine exactly what those preconditions are. Timothy Besley emphasises that it is not just about designing an appropriate institutional framework but also about understanding the way incentives work and the process by which the political class is selected.

Contenu

• 1 Competing Views of Government

• The issues

• This book

• Background

• Economic Policy Making

• Political Economy

• Incentives and Selection in Politics

• Concluding Comments

• 2 The Anatomy of Government Failure

• Introduction

• Three Notions of Government Failure

• The Basic Model

• Government Failure

• Democratic Political Failures

• A Dynamic Model

• Government Failure in the Dynamic Model

• Responses to Political Failure

• Concluding Comments

• 3 Political Agency and Accountability

• Introduction

• Elements of Political Agency Models

• The Baseline Model

• Extensions

• Discussion

• Concluding Comments

• 4 Political Agency and Public Finance

• Introduction

• The Model

• Three Scenarios

• Implications

• Restraining Government

• Debt and Deficits

• Governments versus NGOs

• Competence

• Conclusions