Putin and the Return of History

Vladimir Putin''s invasion of Ukraine has reshaped history. In the decades after the collapse of Soviet communism, the West convinced itself that liberal democracy would henceforth be the dominant, ultimately unique, system of governance. An outburst of Western triumphalism proclaimed a US-led unipolar world entitled to ''impose democracy'' on countries that failed to recognise the new order. Politicians foretold the universalisation of Western values as the final, enduring form of human society, a hubris that shaped how the West would treat Russia for the next two decades. But history wasn''t over. Subsequent events proved it is unwise to make predictions, especially about the future. In February 2022, Vladimir Putin took great delight in proving it. Putin is a paradox. In the early years of his presidency, he appeared to commit himself to friendship with the West, suggesting that Russia could join the European Union or even NATO. He said he supported free-market democracy and civil rights. But the Putin of those years is unrecognisable today. The Putin of the 2020s is an autocratic nationalist, dedicated to repression at home and anti-Western militarism abroad. So, what happened? Was he lying when he proclaimed his support for freedom, democracy and friendship with the West? Or, was he sincere? Did he change his views at some stage between then and now? And if that is the case, what happened to change him? P n and the Return of History examines these questions in the context of Russia''s thousand-year past, tracing the forces and the myths that have shaped Putin''s politics of aggression: the enduring terror of encirclement by outsiders, the subjugation of the individual to the cause of the state, the collectivist values that allow the sacrifice of human lives in battle, the willingness to lie and deceive, the co-opting of religion and the belief in Great Russia''s mission to change the world.>

This is a very important account of the build-up to Russia's invasions of Ukrainian territory. Most books and articles on the Russia-Ukraine war are very one-sided; the great merit of this book is that the Sixsmiths take a long historical perspective and enable the reader to appreciate the aspirations of both sides. The authors focus on the defects of Western societies as well as on those of Russia. This is a study that needs to be taken into account when we try to understand the lessons of the war.

Préface
An original and informative look at Russia's thousand-year past, tracing the forces and the myths that have shaped Putin's politics.

Auteur
Martin Sixsmith is a bestselling author, television and radio presenter and journalist. He began working at the BBC in 1980 as a foreign correspondent, reporting from Moscow during the end of the Cold War, the era of Perestroika, and the collapse of the Soviet Union. In 1997, he went to work for the government of Tony Blair as Director of Communications and Press Secretary to Harriet Harman and then to Alistair Darling. He then served as Director of Communication at the Department for Transport, Local Government, and the Regions. Sixsmith is the author of two political novels, Spin and I Heard Lenin Laugh. He has also published an account of the Litvinenko murder, The Litvinenko File, and made a documentary film in 2008 exploring the legacy of the KGB in today's Russia and the FSB. His book The Lost Child of Philomena Lee was turned into a hugely successful film in 2013, starring Judi Dench.

Résumé
An original history of Russia's thousand-year past, tracing the forces and the myths that have shaped Putin's politics and rekindled the Cold War. Vladimir Putin's invasion of Ukraine has reshaped history. In the decades after the collapse of Soviet communism, the West convinced itself that liberal democracy would henceforth be the dominant, ultimately unique, system of governance - a hubris that shaped how the West would treat Russia for the next two decades. But history wasn't over. Putin is a paradox. In the early years of his presidency, he appeared to commit himself to friendship with the West, suggesting that Russia could join the European Union or even NATO. He said he supported free-market democracy and civil rights. But the Putin of those years is unrecognisable today. The Putin of the 2020s is an autocratic nationalist, dedicated to repression at home and anti-Western militarism abroad. So, what happened? Was he lying when he proclaimed his support for freedom, democracy and friendship with the West? Or, was he sincere? Did he change his views at some stage between then and now? And if that is the case, what happened to change him? Putin and the Return of History examines these questions in the context of Russia's thousand-year past, tracing the forces and the myths that have shaped Putin's politics of aggression: the enduring terror of encirclement by outsiders, the subjugation of the individual to the cause of the state, the collectivist values that allow the sacrifice of human lives in battle, the willingness to lie and deceive, the co-opting of religion and the belief in Great Russia's mission to change the world.