Art and IR Theory

This book examines the correspondence between international relations (IR) theories of structural realism and constructivism and paintings, notably the artwork of Mark Rothko and Jackson Pollock, in a game theory setting. This interdisciplinary approach, through the lens of game theory and semiotics, permits different, enriched interpretations of structural realism and constructivism. These theories constitute an axis of debate between social and systemic approaches to international politics, as well as an axis of differentiation between scientific realism and positivism as philosophies of science. As such, the interpretations explored in this book contribute to what we know about international relations, how semiotics intersect with strategic uncertainty, and explains these interactions in the proposed games model.

The book's use of game theory and semiotics generate 'visual semiotic games' (VSGs) that shed light on the debate axes through strategic uncertainty, interactions,and players' interactive belief systems. VSGs will contribute to literature on experimental semiotics in the sense of players' coordination behavior, beliefs, and artistic evaluations. The equilibria, interpreted through branches of philosophy of mind and theories of explanation, will reveal possibilities of agreement among players about which artwork representing the theory at hand is the best, opening innovative research perspectives for the discipline of IR theory.

Explicates semiotic thinking in the field of IR theory and game theoretic thinking in the field of semiotics Demonstrates affinities of the Nash equilibrium as a solution concept with branches of the philosophy of mind Saussurean and Peircian games open new interpretive avenues in the discipline of IR theories

Auteur
Serdar S. Güner obtained his PhD degree from the Graduate Institute of International Studies, the University of Geneva in 1990. His thesis is titled: A Game Theoretical Analysis of Alliance Formation and Dissolution: The Case Study of the Relationship Among the United States, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China, 1949-1972. He spent the next two years as a postdoctoral research fellow at the Department of Government, the University of Texas at Austin before joining the Department of International Relations, Bilkent University. He won Bilkent University Distinguished Teacher Award in 2002. Serdar S. Güner gave seminars and lectures on game theory and negotiation problems at various government agencies and universities, participated to international conventions, served as a referee for scientific journals. He is an amateur trumpet player and painter.

Contenu
Preface.- Chapter 1 Scope and Method.- Chapter 2 Structural Constraints and Non-Unique Dynamic Anarchies.- Chapter 3 Art Versus IR Theory.- Chapter 4 Preferences and Equilibrium.- Chapter 5 Saussurean Games.- Chapter 6 Peircian Games.- Chapter 7 Hybrid Games.- Chapter 8 Interpretations.- Summing Up.- References.