The Political Economy of Plea Bargaining

Auteur

Robert Schehr is a Professor in the Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice at Northern Arizona University, USA. His research expertise and publications focus on wrongful conviction, the political economy of law and order, and the jurisprudence of plea bargaining. He is an international speaker on the topic of wrongful conviction. Professor Schehr received a PhD in Sociology from Purdue University in 1991, completed a post-doctoral fellowship at the University of Georgia, and has held positions at Colgate University and the University of Illinois at Springfield. Dr Schehr has been a United States Fulbright Scholar, during which he taught at both Griffith College Law School and Trinity College Law School, Ireland. In May of 2022, Dr Schehr completed a Master's in the Study of Law at Yale Law School.

Texte du rabat

The Political Economy of Plea Bargaining provides the political, economic, and cultural context for understanding the evolution of plea bargaining as a juridical technology implemented to ensure the efficient administration of violations of criminal law.

Résumé
The Political Economy of Plea Bargaining provides the political, economic, and cultural context for understanding the evolution of plea bargaining as a juridical technology implemented to ensure the efficient administration of violations of criminal law.

Contenu

List of figures Preface Acknowledgements Part One Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4 Part Two Chapter 5 Chapter 6 Chapter 7 Chapter 8 Chapter 9 Index