Immigration and Discrimination

Informationen zum Autor Sahar Akhtar is Visiting Professor at Georgetown University. She received a PhD in Philosophy from Duke University and a PhD in Economics from George Mason University and often writes and teaches at the intersection of these fields. She has taught in the Bioethics Program at UVA and the Political Theory Project at Brown University, where she was a postdoctoral fellow. Klappentext Immigration and Discrimination explores what bases states are morally permitted to use for their admission decisions and policies, and why. Sahar Akhtar argues that the idea of wrongful discrimination can be applied to states' admission decisions, and what this means in terms of states' rights with regard to immigration. Zusammenfassung Prompted both by past policies and recent developments concerning immigration around the world that center on race, ethnicity, religion, and other identities, Immigration and Discrimination explores what bases states are morally permitted to use for their admission decisions and policies, and why. Many scholars appeal to the terminology and concept of wrongful discrimination when discussing identity-based immigration decisions, but there has been little to no effort dedicated to examining whether the idea of wrongful discrimination--traditionally applied to interactions among people within a state--is applicable at the global level, or to interactions among people in different states. Drawing on economic and empirical literature where available, Sahar Akhtar tries to fill this gap by demonstrating why the idea of wrongful discrimination can be applied to states' admission decisions, and what this means in terms of states' rights with regard to immigration. Rather than rejecting any connection between immigration decisions and identity, Akhtar argues that it is often morally permissible to exclude people based in their identity, especially, but not only, when it is done by disadvantaged groups. Despite this finding, however, a major implication of the arguments and analysis provided here is that it is not plausible to think that states have the "right to exclude". Thus, Akhtar concludes by demonstrating why states are not unilaterally entitled to make decisions about whom to admit into their borders. Inhaltsverzeichnis Introduction 1: Race, Ethnicity, and Religion under States' Choice 2: Core Elements of Antidiscrimination 3: Race, Ethnicity, and Religion in the Global Context 4: Global Antidiscrimination Duties 5: The Primary Duties 6: Between the Primary Duties and Open Borders 7: Rethinking the Right to Exclude ...

Auteur
Sahar Akhtar is Visiting Professor at Georgetown University. She received a PhD in Philosophy from Duke University and a PhD in Economics from George Mason University and often writes and teaches at the intersection of these fields. She has taught in the Bioethics Program at UVA and the Political Theory Project at Brown University, where she was a postdoctoral fellow.

Texte du rabat

Immigration and Discrimination explores what bases states are morally permitted to use for their admission decisions and policies, and why. Sahar Akhtar argues that the idea of wrongful discrimination can be applied to states' admission decisions, and what this means in terms of states' rights with regard to immigration.

Résumé
Prompted both by past policies and recent developments concerning immigration around the world that center on race, ethnicity, religion, and other identities, Immigration and Discrimination explores what bases states are morally permitted to use for their admission decisions and policies, and why. Many scholars appeal to the terminology and concept of wrongful discrimination when discussing identity-based immigration decisions, but there has been little to no effort dedicated to examining whether the idea of wrongful discrimination--traditionally applied to interactions among people within a state--is applicable at the global level, or to interactions among people in different states. Drawing on economic and empirical literature where available, Sahar Akhtar tries to fill this gap by demonstrating why the idea of wrongful discrimination can be applied to states' admission decisions, and what this means in terms of states' rights with regard to immigration. Rather than rejecting any connection between immigration decisions and identity, Akhtar argues that it is often morally permissible to exclude people based in their identity, especially, but not only, when it is done by disadvantaged groups. Despite this finding, however, a major implication of the arguments and analysis provided here is that it is not plausible to think that states have the "right to exclude". Thus, Akhtar concludes by demonstrating why states are not unilaterally entitled to make decisions about whom to admit into their borders.