Internal War and the Search for Normative Order

The present study is concerned with the development and the applica tions of legal norms to situations of civil strife. It also deals in a less intensive way with problems of adjustment of these norms when the ambiance of the system changes. In particular it deals with the con cept of belligerent recognition, a standard well-suited to the needs of the international systeum nder a balance of power arrangement and to what extent this norm, which became fully developed during the nineteenth century, has been altered to meet the needs of the new international system which has been called a loose bipolar system. Revolution has been a classic theme of social and political thinkers throughout history. Some have regarded revolutions as completely unjustifiable, while others view them as a force for progress, if not the sole agent for major social adjustment. Political evolutionists re gard revolutions which erupt in social violence as necessary social con ditioning, as a way of selecting the political elite. Those who regard social violence as healthy and good, proceed to layout prudential rules for the conduct and successful conclusion of revolutions. Those who regard social violence as unhealthy and bad, tend to stress the norms of "law and order"; and to hurl at revolutionists the imprecations of a moral law which enjoins necessary obedience to authority. The present treatise pursues none of these interesting possibilities.

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The present study is concerned with the development and the applica­ tions of legal norms to situations of civil strife. It also deals in a less intensive way with problems of adjustment of these norms when the ambiance of the system changes. In particular it deals with the con­ cept of belligerent recognition, a standard well-suited to the needs of the international systeum nder a balance of power arrangement and to what extent this norm, which became fully developed during the nineteenth century, has been altered to meet the needs of the new international system which has been called a loose bipolar system. Revolution has been a classic theme of social and political thinkers throughout history. Some have regarded revolutions as completely unjustifiable, while others view them as a force for progress, if not the sole agent for major social adjustment. Political evolutionists re­ gard revolutions which erupt in social violence as necessary social con­ ditioning, as a way of selecting the political elite. Those who regard social violence as healthy and good, proceed to layout prudential rules for the conduct and successful conclusion of revolutions. Those who regard social violence as unhealthy and bad, tend to stress the norms of "law and order"; and to hurl at revolutionists the imprecations of a moral law which enjoins necessary obedience to authority. The present treatise pursues none of these interesting possibilities.

Contenu
I. Historical Development of Belligerent Recognition.- 1. The American Revolution.- 2. Spanish Colonial Wars for Independence, 18101823.- II. Pre-1861 Civil Conflicts which Indicated a Need for the Status of Insurgency.- 1. The Greek Insurrection Against the Sublime Porte, 1821.- 2. The Polish Uprising, 183031.- 3. The Canadian Insurrection, 183839.- 4. The Revolution of Texas, 1836.- 5. The Vivanco Insurrection in Peru, 18561858.- III. Methods of According Belligerent Recognition.- 1. The American Civil War and Development of the Concept of Belligerence.- 2. Nature and Form of Recognition: By Third States.- 3. Recognition by Foreign States.- 4. Nature and Form of Recognition: by the Parent Government.- 5. The Source of Recognition.- IV. Criteria for Timing a Grant of Belligerence.- 1. The American Argument for the Appropriate Timing of Belligerent Rights.- 2. The British Position.- 3. The View of Scholars and Publicists on the Matter of Recognition.- 4. The Geneva Arbitrations and the Question of Premature Recognition.- 5. Criteria for Timing a Grant of Belligerent Recognition.- 6. The Question of a Right of Recognition.- 7. May the Established Government Demand Belligerent Recognition as of Right ?.- V. Belligerent Recognition as de Facto Recognition of the Insurgent Government.- 1. Essential Informal Relations With an Insurgent Government.- 2. Judicial Decisions Respecting De Facto Nature of Insurgent Governments.- 3. Norms of De Facto Recognition of the Insurgent Government.- 4. The Uses of De Facto Recognition.- VI. Succession to Treaty Responsibilities in Civil Wars.- 1. The Traditional Law of Treaty Succession.- 2. Success or Failure as a Criterion for Treaty Succession.- 3. Effects of Recognition of Belligerency on Treaty Succession.- 4. Successionto Multipartite Treaties When Belligerency has been Recognized.- 5. Treaty Succession in Internal Wars Since The American Civil War.- VII. The Decline of Belligerent Recognition: Desuetude in International Law.- 1. Belligerent Recognition After the American Civil War.- 2. Reasons for the Non-Use of Belligerent Recognition.- 3. Belligerent Recognition and Desuetude.- VIII. Some Observations on Current Practice.- 1. The Nature of the System Change.- 2. The Decline of Insurgent Recognition.- 3. The Modality of Intervention.- 4. Patterns of Intervention.- 5. Developing Patterns of Bloc Intervention.- 6. Toward an International Law of Civil Conflicts.- 7. Tables of Interventions in Civil Wars, 19451967.- 8. Summary.