The Externalist Challenge

Die Debatte zwischen Internalismus und Externalismus steht im Brennpunkt der Aufmerksamkeit sowohl in der Epistemologie als auch in der Philosophie des Geistes und der Sprache. Der Externalismus fordert grundlegende traditionelle Auffassungen der Natur der Erkenntnis, der Rechtfertigung, des Denkens und der Sprache heraus. Auf dem Spiel steht nichts Geringeres als die Form, die Theorien in der Epistemologie und der Philosophie des Geistes annehmen sollten. Dieser Band ist eine Sammlung von Originalbeiträgen international führender Autoren, die den Forschungs- und Diskussionsstand hinsichtlich der faszinierenden Kontroversen zwischen Internalismus und Externalismus widerspiegeln.

Auteur

Richard Schantz ist Professor für Philosophie an der Universität Siegen.

Contenu
I In Defence of Epistemic Externalism W. P. Alston, The "Challenge" of Externalism; J. Greco, Externalism and Skepticism; Th. Grundmann, Counterexamples to Epistemic Externalism Revisited; H. Kornblith, Conditions on Cognitive Sanity and the Death of Internalism; R. Schantz, Empiricism Externalized; E. Sosa, Circularity and Epistemic Priority II Critiques of Epistemic Externalism J. Cruz and J. Pollock, The Chimerical Appeal of Epistemic Externalism; R. Feldman, In Search of Internalism and Externalism; R. Fumerton, Inferential Internalism and the Presuppositions of Skeptical Arguments; K. Lehrer and D. A. Truncelitto, Knowledge, Justification and the Cooperative World; B. Stroud, The Epistemological Promise of Externalism; M. Williams, Is Knowledge a Natural Phenomenon? III In Defence of Content Externalism J. Haugeland, Social Cartesianism; R. Garrett Millikan, Existence Proof for a Viable Externalism; K. Sterelny, Externalism, Epistemic Artefacts and the Extended Mind; R. Van Gulick, Outing the Mind - A Teleopragmatic Perspective IVCritiques of Content Externalism J. Heil, Natural Intentionality; T. Horgan, J. Tienson and G. Graham, Phenomenal Intentionality and the Brain in a Vat; F. Jackson, On an Argument from Properties of Words to Broad Content; G. M. A. Segal, Reference, Causal Powers, Externalist Intuitions and Unicorns VAn Exemplary Debate about Content G. Rey, Millikan's (Un?)Compromised Externalism; R. Garrett Millikan, Comments on "Millikan's (Un?)Compromised Externalism" VISelf-Knowledge S. Bernecker, Believing that You Know and Knowing that You Believe; A. Brueckner, McKinsey Redux?; F. Dretske, Knowing what You Think vs Knowing that You think it; P. Jacob, Do we Know how we Know our own Minds yet?; P. Ludlow, What was I Thinking? Social Externalism, Self-Knowledge, and Shifting Memory Targets; B. McLaughlin, Anti-Individualism and Minimal Self-Knowledge: A Dissolution of Ebbs's Puzzle VIIThe Epistemic Significance of Perception Ch. Peacocke, Explaining Perceptual Entitlement; J. Van Cleve, Externalism and Disjunctivism VIIIAn Essay on Intentionality C. McGinn, The Objects of Intentionality