Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Action

What is self-control? Does a person need to be conscious to act? Are delusions always irrational? Questions such as these are fundamental for investigations into action and rationality, as well as how we assign responsibility for wrongdoing and assess clinical symptoms. Bridging the gap between philosophy and psychology, this interdisciplinary collection showcases how empirical research informs and enriches core questions in the philosophy of action.Exploring issues such as truth, moral judgement, agency, consciousness and cognitive control, chapters offer an overview of the current state of research, present new empirical findings and identify where future experimental work can further advance the frontier between philosophy and psychology. This is an essential resource for anyone looking to better understand how science and philosophy can meaningfully inform our knowledge of human agency.>

Préface
Brings together recent experimental work in philosophy of action and presents new empirical findings at the intersection of philosophy and psychology.

Auteur

Paul Henne is Assistant Professor of Philosophy and Neuroscience at Lake Forest College, USA.

Samuel Murray is Assistant Professor in the Philosophy Department and Neuroscience Program at Providence College, USA.

Contenu

List of Figures
List of Tables
Notes on Contributors

Introduction to Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Action, Samuel Murray and Paul Henne

1. Consciousness, Phenomenal Consciousness, and Free Will, Justin Sytsma and Melissa Snater
2. Skilled Action and Metacognitive Control, Myrto Mylopoulos
3. Bringing Self-Control into the Future, Samuel Murray
4. Who is Responsible? Split Brains, Dissociative Identity Disorder, and Implicit Attitudes, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
5. The Everyday Irrationality of Monothematic Delusion, Paul Noordhof and Ema Sullivan-Bissett
6. Truth, Perspective, and Norms Of Assertion: New Findings and Theoretical Advances, John Turri
7. The Distinct Functions of Belief and Desire in Intentional Action Explanation, Joanna Korman
8. Free Enough: Human Cognition (and Cultural Interests) Warrant Responsibility, Cory J Clark, Heather M Maranges, Brian B Boutwell, and Roy F Baumeister
9. Beyond the Courtroom: Agency and the Perception of Free Will, Edouard Machery, Markus Kneer, Pascale Willemsen, and Albert Newen
10. Do Rape Cases Sit in a Moral Blindspot? The Dual Process Theory of Moral Judgment and Rape, Katrina L. Sifferd
11. How People Think About Moral Excellence: The Role of Counterfactual Thoughts in Reasoning about Morally Good Actions, Shane Timmons and Ruth M.J. Byrne
12. Why Idealized Agency Gets Animal (and Human) Agency Wrong, Caroline T. Arruda and Daniel J. Povinelli
    Index