Eisenhower, MacMillan and the Problem of Nasser

The years 1955-59 were a vital transitional period for the Anglo-American relationship in the Middle East. British and American leaders sought to protect cold war and oil interests in the region against the background of a renaissance of Arab nationalism personified by the Egyptian leader Nasser. With the aid of extensive declassified official documentation, this study traces the British and American responses to the Turco-Iraqi Pact of 1955, the Suez crisis, the Syrian crisis of 1957, the outbreak of civil strife in Lebanon, and the Iraqi Revolution of 1958. It shows how the differing priorities of the two powers in the region promoted a patchwork of confrontation and cooperation over Middle Eastern questions. For Britain, this study reveals that it was the Iraqi Revolution rather than Suez which led to a redefinition of strategy in the region, and a concentration on the defence of her oil interests in the Gulf.

Auteur

NIGEL J. ASHTON

Résumé
With the aid of extensive declassified official documentation, this study traces the British and American responses to the Turco-Iraqi Pact of 1955, the Suez crisis, the Syrian crisis of 1957, the outbreak of civil strife in Lebanon, and the Iraqi Revolution of 1958.

Contenu
Introduction - The Middle East in 1955 - The Background to the Formation of the Baghdad Pact - March 1956 and the Break with Nasser -The Suez Crisis - The Eisenhower Doctrine - The Bermuda Conference and the April 1957 Crisis in Jordan - The Syrian Crisis and the October 1957 Talks - The Formation of the United Arab Republic - The Lebanese Crisis - The Iraqi Revolution - The Course and Conclusion of British and American Intervention - Post-Revolutionary Iraq and the Reassessment of British and American Strategy - Conclusions - Postscript - Index