Economic Signals

This Brief sheds new light on three specific aspects of economic behavior companies offering prize promotions, individuals making anonymous donations, and politicians creating political advertisements. These are considered signals that firms send to consumers, donors send to others, and politicians send to voters, respectively. The author shows why firms, donors, and politicians employ these behaviors, and what their social consequences are from an economic theory perspective. This book is intended for readers who are interested in industrial organization, the economics of giving, and political economics. Each topic can be seen as an application of simple economic theory to an unusual subject matter in economics. Thus, for students, this work also offers an introduction to analytical methods in time-inconsistency and involving asymmetric information. The problems and economic settings behind these topics are firms' time-inconsistency in a monopoly, asymmetric information inindividual altruism, and asymmetric information regarding types of politicians.

Sheds lights on new aspects of prize promotions, anonymous giving, and political advertisements Applies simple economic theory to these unusual subject matters in economics Introduces analytical methods in firms' optimization problems and asymmetric information

Auteur
Masaoki Tamura is an assistant professor at Nagoya University of Commerce and Business and visiting scholar of the Research Institute of Capital Formation, Development Bank of Japan. Born in 1982, he received a Bachelor's degree in economics at Kyoto University in 2005 and a Ph.D. in economics at the University of Tokyo in 2014. He worked for Hitotsubashi University and Kyoto University before joining Nagoya University of Commerce and Business.

Contenu

1 Tools Used in this Book.- 2 Prize Promotions for Solving Firms' Time Inconsistency.- 3 Giving and Anonymous Giving for Signaling.- 4 A Signaling Explanation for Political Parties and Advertisements.