Judicial Discretion within Adjudicative Committee Proceedings in China

This book uses bounded rationality theory to formulate an analytic framework for a systematic and comprehensive examination of the impacts of organizational factors on discretion within Adjudicative Committees' decision-making processes.

This book studies the organizational influences on judicial discretion within Adjudicative Committee (AC) proceedings in China. It argues that institutional reforms and practice have mainly reduced judicial discretion within AC proceedings through the rationalization of organizational processes. This central argument will be of particular interest to the readers, as previous studies offer little insight into the overall impacts of judicial institution reforms. This book is the first that uses the bounded rationality theory developed in economics and related disciplines to formulate an analytic framework for a systematic and comprehensive examination of the impacts of organizational factors on discretion within Adjudicative Committees' decision-making processes. Readers will gain a practical and fresh understanding of the Chinese judicial reforms.

Covers a normative breakthrough in the Chinese legal system Presents an original theoretical hypothesis Interdisciplinary lens employed to offer fresh perspectives Offers a closer examination of the Chinese judicial reform Includes a vast amount of empirical evidence Includes supplementary material: sn.pub/extras

Contenu
Introduction.- The Organization of the Court.- Committee Goal.- Information Processing.- Committee Composition.- Committee Procedure.- Discretion, Judicial Independence and Accountability.- Concluding Remarks.