Personnel Economics in Practice

Klappentext Personnel Economics in Practice, 3rd Edition by Edward Lazear and Michael Gibbs gives readers a rigorous framework for understanding organizational design and the management of employees. Economics has proven to be a powerful approach in the changing study of organizations and human resources by adding rigor and structure and clarifying many important issues. Not only will readers learn and apply ideas from microeconomics, they will also learn principles that will be valuable in their future careers. Zusammenfassung Personnel Economics in Practice! 3rd Edition by Edward Lazear and Michael Gibbs gives readers a rigorous framework for understanding organizational design and the management of employees. Economics has proven to be a powerful approach in the changing study of organizations and human resources by adding rigor and structure and clarifying many important issues. Not only will readers learn and apply ideas from microeconomics! they will also learn principles that will be valuable in their future careers. Inhaltsverzeichnis ABOUT THE AUTHORSPREFACEACKNOWLEDGMENTSPART ONE SORTING AND INVESTING IN EMPLOYEESCHAPTER 1 SETTING HIRING STANDARDSAn Example: Hiring Risky WorkersNew Hires as OptionsAnalysisA CounterargumentSetting Hiring StandardsBalancing Benefits Against CostsForeign CompetitionThe Method of ProductionHow Many Workers to Hire?Other FactorsMaking Decisions with Imperfect InformationMake a Decision Independent of AnalysisEstimate the Relevant InformationExperimentSummaryStudy QuestionsReferencesFurther ReadingAppendix (available online)CHAPTER 2 RECRUITMENTIntroductionScreening Job ApplicantsCredentialsLearning a Worker's ProductivityIs Screening Profitable? For Whom?ProbationSignalingWho Pays, and Who Benefits?ExamplesSignaling More Formally: Separating and Pooling EquilibriaWhich Type of Firm is More Likely to use Signaling?SummaryStudy QuestionsReferencesFurther ReadingAppendix (available online)CHAPTER 3 INVESTMENT IN SKILLSIntroductionMatchingInvestments in EducationEffects of Costs and BenefitsWas Benjamin Franklin Correct?Investments in On the Job TrainingGeneral vs. Firm-Specific Human CapitalWho Should Pay for Training?Implications of On the Job TrainingRent Sharing and CompensationImplicit ContractingSummaryStudy QuestionsReferencesFurther ReadingAppendix (available online)CHAPTER 4 MANAGING TURNOVERIntroductionIs Turnover Good or Bad?Importance of SortingTechnical ChangeOrganizational ChangeHierarchical StructureSpecific Human CapitalRetention StrategiesReducing Costs of Losing Key EmployeesEmbracing TurnoverBidding for EmployeesRaiding Other Firms: Benefits and PitfallsOffer MatchingLayoffs and BuyoutsWho to Target for LayoffsBuyoutsSummaryStudy QuestionsReferencesFurther ReadingAppendix (available online)PART TWO ORGANIZATIONAL AND JOB DESIGNCHAPTER 5 DECISION MAKINGIntroductionThe Organization of an EconomyMarkets as Information SystemsMarkets as Incentive SystemsMarkets and InnovationBenefits of Central PlanningThe Market as Metaphor for Organizational DesignBenefits of CentralizationEconomies of Scale or Public GoodsBetter Use of Central KnowledgeCoordinationBenefits of DecentralizationSpecific vs. General KnowledgeOther Benefits of DecentralizationAuthority and ResponsibilityDecision Making as a Multistage ProcessFlat vs. Hierarchical StructuresInvesting in Better Quality Decision MakingSummaryStudy QuestionsReferencesFurther ReadingAppendix (available online)CHAPTER 6 ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTUREIntroductionTypes of Organizational StructuresHierarchyFunctional StructureDivisional StructureMatrix or Project StructureNetwork StructureWhich Structure Should a Firm Use?CoordinationTwo Types of Coordination ProblemsCoordinatio...

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ABOUT THE AUTHORS PREFACE ACKNOWLEDGMENTS PART ONE SORTING AND INVESTING IN EMPLOYEES CHAPTER 1 SETTING HIRING STANDARDS An Example: Hiring Risky Workers New Hires as Options Analysis A Counterargument Setting Hiring Standards Balancing Benefits Against Costs Foreign Competition The Method of Production How Many Workers to Hire? Other Factors Making Decisions with Imperfect Information Make a Decision Independent of Analysis Estimate the Relevant Information Experiment Summary Study Questions References Further Reading Appendix (available online) CHAPTER 2 RECRUITMENT Introduction Screening Job Applicants Credentials Learning a Worker's Productivity Is Screening Profitable? For Whom? Probation Signaling Who Pays, and Who Benefits? Examples Signaling More Formally: Separating and Pooling Equilibria Which Type of Firm is More Likely to use Signaling? Summary Study Questions References Further Reading Appendix (available online) CHAPTER 3 INVESTMENT IN SKILLS Introduction Matching Investments in Education Effects of Costs and Benefits Was Benjamin Franklin Correct? Investments in On the Job Training General vs. Firm-Specific Human Capital Who Should Pay for Training? Implications of On the Job Training Rent Sharing and Compensation Implicit Contracting Summary Study Questions References Further Reading Appendix (available online) CHAPTER 4 MANAGING TURNOVER Introduction Is Turnover Good or Bad? Importance of Sorting Technical Change Organizational Change Hierarchical Structure Specific Human Capital Retention Strategies Reducing Costs of Losing Key Employees Embracing Turnover Bidding for Employees Raiding Other Firms: Benefits and Pitfalls Offer Matching Layoffs and Buyouts Who to Target for Layoffs Buyouts Summary Study Questions References Further Reading Appendix (available online) PART TWO ORGANIZATIONAL AND JOB DESIGN CHAPTER 5 DECISION MAKING Introduction The Organization of an Economy Markets as Information Systems Markets as Incentive Systems Markets and Innovation Benefits of Central Planning The Market as Metaphor for Organizational Design Benefits of Centralization Economies of Scale or Public Goods Better Use of Central Knowledge Coordination Benefits of Decentralization Specific vs. General Knowledge Other Benefits of Decentralization Authority and Responsibility Decision Making as a Multistage Process Flat vs. Hierarchical Structures Investing in Better Quality Decision Making Summary Study Questions References Further Reading Appendix (available online) CHAPTER 6 ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE Introduction Types of Organizational Structures Hierarchy Functional Structure Divisional Structure Matrix or Project Structure Network Structure Which Structure Should a Firm Use? Coordination Two Types of Coordination Problems Coordination Mechanisms Implementation Span of Control and Number of Levels in a Hierarchy Skills, Pay, and Structure Evolution of a Firm's Structure Summary Study Questions References Further Reading CHAPTER 7 JOB DESIGN Introduction Patterns of Job Design Optimal Job Design: Skills, Tasks, and Decisions Multiskilling and Multitasking Decisions Complementarity and Job Design When to Use Different Job Designs Taylorism Factors Pushing Toward Taylorism or Continuous Improvement Intrinsic Motivation Summary Study Questions References Further Reading Appendix (available online) CHAPTER 8 ADVANCED JOB DESIGN Introduction Teams Group Decision Making Free Rider Effects When to Use Teams Other Benefits of Team Production Implementation of Teams Team Composition Worker-Owned Firms Effects of Information Technology Effects on Organizational Structure Effects on Job Design High Reliability Organizations Summary Study Questions References Further Reading Appendix (available online) PART THREE PAYING FOR PERFORMANCE CHAPTER 9 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION Introduction Purposes of Performance Evaluation Ways to Evaluate Performance Quantitative Performance Measurement Risk Profile Risk vs. Distortion: Performance Measure Scope Match of the Performance Measure to Job Design Manipulation Subjective Evaluation Why Use Subjective Evaluations? The Benefits of Subjective Evaluations Practical Considerations Summary Study Questions References Further Reading CHAPTER 10 RE…