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Klappentext Personnel Economics in Practice, 3rd Edition by Edward Lazear and Michael Gibbs gives readers a rigorous framework for understanding organizational design and the management of employees. Economics has proven to be a powerful approach in the changing study of organizations and human resources by adding rigor and structure and clarifying many important issues. Not only will readers learn and apply ideas from microeconomics, they will also learn principles that will be valuable in their future careers. Zusammenfassung Personnel Economics in Practice! 3rd Edition by Edward Lazear and Michael Gibbs gives readers a rigorous framework for understanding organizational design and the management of employees. Economics has proven to be a powerful approach in the changing study of organizations and human resources by adding rigor and structure and clarifying many important issues. Not only will readers learn and apply ideas from microeconomics! they will also learn principles that will be valuable in their future careers. Inhaltsverzeichnis ABOUT THE AUTHORS PREFACE ACKNOWLEDGMENTS PART ONE SORTING AND INVESTING IN EMPLOYEES CHAPTER 1 SETTING HIRING STANDARDS An Example: Hiring Risky Workers New Hires as Options Analysis A Counterargument Setting Hiring Standards Balancing Benefits Against Costs Foreign Competition The Method of Production How Many Workers to Hire? Other Factors Making Decisions with Imperfect Information Make a Decision Independent of Analysis Estimate the Relevant Information Experiment Summary Study Questions References Further Reading Appendix (available online) CHAPTER 2 RECRUITMENT Introduction Screening Job Applicants Credentials Learning a Worker's Productivity Is Screening Profitable? For Whom? Probation Signaling Who Pays, and Who Benefits? Examples Signaling More Formally: Separating and Pooling Equilibria Which Type of Firm is More Likely to use Signaling? Summary Study Questions References Further Reading Appendix (available online) CHAPTER 3 INVESTMENT IN SKILLS Introduction Matching Investments in Education Effects of Costs and Benefits Was Benjamin Franklin Correct? Investments in On the Job Training General vs. Firm-Specific Human Capital Who Should Pay for Training? Implications of On the Job Training Rent Sharing and Compensation Implicit Contracting Summary Study Questions References Further Reading Appendix (available online) CHAPTER 4 MANAGING TURNOVER Introduction Is Turnover Good or Bad? Importance of Sorting Technical Change Organizational Change Hierarchical Structure Specific Human Capital Retention Strategies Reducing Costs of Losing Key Employees Embracing Turnover Bidding for Employees Raiding Other Firms: Benefits and Pitfalls Offer Matching Layoffs and Buyouts Who to Target for Layoffs Buyouts Summary Study Questions References Further Reading Appendix (available online) PART TWO ORGANIZATIONAL AND JOB DESIGN CHAPTER 5 DECISION MAKING Introduction The Organization of an Economy Markets as Information Systems Markets as Incentive Systems Markets and Innovation ABOUT THE AUTHORS
PREFACE
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
PART ONE SORTING AND INVESTING IN EMPLOYEES
CHAPTER 1 SETTING HIRING STANDARDS
An Example: Hiring Risky Workers
New Hires as Options
Analysis
A Counterargument
Setting Hiring Standards
Balancing Benefits Against Costs
Foreign Competition
The Method of Production
How Many Workers to Hire?
Other Factors
Making Decisions with Imperfect Information
Make a Decision Independent of Analysis
Estimate the Relevant Information
Experiment
Summary
Study Questions
References
Further Reading
Appendix (available online)
CHAPTER 2 RECRUITMENT
Introduction
Screening Job Applicants
Credentials
Learning a Worker's Productivity
Is Screening Profitable? For Whom?
Probation
Signaling
Who Pays, and Who Benefits?
Examples
Signaling More Formally: Separating and Pooling Equilibria
Which Type of Firm is More Likely to use Signaling?
Summary
Study Questions
References
Further Reading
Appendix (available online)
CHAPTER 3 INVESTMENT IN SKILLS
Introduction
Matching
Investments in Education
Effects of Costs and Benefits
Was Benjamin Franklin Correct?
Investments in On the Job Training
General vs. Firm-Specific Human Capital
Who Should Pay for Training?
Implications of On the Job Training
Rent Sharing and Compensation
Implicit Contracting
Summary
Study Questions
References
Further Reading
Appendix (available online)
CHAPTER 4 MANAGING TURNOVER
Introduction
Is Turnover Good or Bad?
Importance of Sorting
Technical Change
Organizational Change
Hierarchical Structure
Specific Human Capital
Retention Strategies
Reducing Costs of Losing Key Employees
Embracing Turnover
Bidding for Employees
Raiding Other Firms: Benefits and Pitfalls
Offer Matching
Layoffs and Buyouts
Who to Target for Layoffs
Buyouts
Summary
Study Questions
References
Further Reading
Appendix (available online)
**PART TWO ORGANIZATIONAL AND JOB DESIGN
CHAPTER 5 DECISION MAKING
Introduction
The Organization of an Economy
Markets as Information Systems
Markets as Incentive Systems
Markets and Innovation
Benefits of Central Planning
The Market as Metaphor for Organizational Design
Benefits of Centralization
Economies of Scale or Public Goods
Better Use of Central Knowledge
Coordination
Benefits of Decentralization
Specific vs. General Knowledge
Other Benefits of Decentralization
Authority and Responsibility
Decision Making as a Multistage Process
Flat vs. Hierarchical Structures
Investing in Better Quality Decision Making
Summary
Study Questions
References
Further Reading
Appendix (available online)
CHAPTER 6 ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
Introduction
Types of Organizational Structures
Hierarchy
Functional Structure
Divisional Structure
Matrix or Project Structure
Network Structure
Which Structure Should a Firm Use?
Coordination
Two Types of Coordination Problems
Coordination Mechanisms
Implementation
Span of Control and Number of Levels in a Hierarchy
Skills, Pay, and Structure
Evolution of a Firm's Structure
Summary
Study Questions
References
Further Reading
CHAPTER 7 JOB DESIGN
Introduction
Patterns of Job Design
Optimal Job Design: Skills, Tasks, and Decisions
Multiskilling and Multitasking
Decisions
Complementarity and Job Design
When to Use Different Job Designs
Taylorism
Factors Pushing Toward Taylorism or Continuous Improvement
Intrinsic Motivation
Summary
Study Questions
References
Further Reading
Appendix (available online)
CHAPTER 8 ADVANCED JOB DESIGN
Introduction
Teams
Group Decision Making
Free Rider Effects
When to Use Teams
Other Benefits of Team Production
Implementation of Teams
Team Composition
Worker-Owned Firms
Effects of Information Technology
Effects on Organizational Structure
Effects on Job Design
High Reliability Organizations
Summary
Study Questions
References
Further Reading
Appendix (available online)
**PART THREE PAYING FOR PERFORMANCE
CHAPTER 9 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Introduction
Purposes of Performance Evaluation
Ways to Evaluate Performance
Qua…