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Informationen zum Autor Kevin Walton is Lecturer in the Sydney Law School and the Director of the Julius Stone Institute of Jurisprudence at the University of Sydney, Australia. Klappentext This book suggests a new direction for the old and lately vigorous debate about whether there is a moral obligation to obey the law. It argues that the imposition of unnecessary conditions has misdirected the search for such an obligation. These conditions matter - they favour some arguments over others - and they ought not to be accepted without adequate justification. The book starts by asking what must be established by any argument for a moral obligation to obey the law. It asks what follows from a moral obligation to obey the law being a moral obligation. It then asks what follows from a moral obligation to obey the law being a species of political obligation. Finally, it asks what follows from a moral obligation to obey the law being an obligation to obey. Having identified the conditions that any argument must satisfy, the book considers their implications for three well-known arguments - the argument from consent, the argument from the natural duty of justice, and the argument from membership. It also identifies the further conditions that each particular argument must satisfy. In doing so, it aims to reorient our deliberations on the morality of obeying the law. Vorwort Focuses on the moral obligation to do as the law requires because the law so requires, exploring issues of law's nature, its authority, and its legitimacy. Zusammenfassung This book suggests a new direction for the old and lately vigorous debate about whether there is a moral obligation to obey the law. It argues that the imposition of unnecessary conditions has misdirected the search for such an obligation. These conditions matter they favour some arguments over others and they ought not to be accepted without adequate justification. The book starts by asking what must be established by any argument for a moral obligation to obey the law. It asks what follows from a moral obligation to obey the law being a moral obligation. It then asks what follows from a moral obligation to obey the law being a species of political obligation. Finally, it asks what follows from a moral obligation to obey the law being an obligation to obey. Having identified the conditions that any argument must satisfy, the book considers their implications for three well-known arguments the argument from consent, the argument from the natural duty of justice, and the argument from membership. It also identifies the further conditions that each particular argument must satisfy. In doing so, it aims to reorient our deliberations on the morality of obeying the law. Inhaltsverzeichnis 1. Introduction2. Moral Obligation3. Political Obligation4. Obedience5. Consent 6. The Natural Duty of Justice7. Membership8. Conclusion...
Préface
This book focuses on the moral obligation to do as the law requires because the law so requires, exploring issues of law's nature, its authority, and its legitimacy.
Auteur
Kevin Walton is Lecturer in the Sydney Law School and the Director of the Julius Stone Institute of Jurisprudence at the University of Sydney, Australia.
Résumé
This book suggests a new direction for the old and lately vigorous debate about whether there is a moral obligation to obey the law. It argues that the imposition of unnecessary conditions has misdirected the search for such an obligation. These conditions matter they favour some arguments over others and they ought not to be accepted without adequate justification. The book starts by asking what must be established by an argument for a moral obligation to obey the law. It asks what follows from a moral obligation to obey the law being a moral obligation. It then asks what follows from a moral obligation to obey the law being a species of political obligation. Finally, it asks what follows from a moral obligation to obey the law being an obligation to obey. Having identified the conditions to be satisfied, the book considers three arguments. Two of these arguments the argument from consent and the argument from the natural duty of justice are more promising than is often thought. The third the argument from membership is doubted.
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