The Operation of the Japanese Electoral System since 1994

This research explores one of the baffling mysteries in contemporary non-Western democracies. The conversion to a mixed system of the first-past-the-post system and proportional representation for the Japanese House of Representatives in 1994 has not realised the widely spread desire for recurrent changes of government, as the Liberal Democratic Party have maintained their grip. Dr Nagatomi monitors Japanese politics with the theories and methodologies of electoral geography. From a comparative perspective, the operation of the electoral system can mostly be explained by the geographical distributions of party supports, the arrangements of electoral constituencies and the candidacies of parties. Packed with a volume of the analyses unpublished elsewhere, this book will offer food for thought to political scientists, Asian watchers and broadly comparative researchers.

Offers a new conceptualization of Japanese electoral politics Examines the shortcomings of democracy in Japan Proposes a vision for reform

Auteur

Kazuaki Nagatomi has taught at Kyoto University, Ryukoku University and Keio University in Japan. Prior to this, he completed his study with the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the Department of Politics at the University of Sheffield in the United Kingdom, after graduating from the School of Political Science and Economics at Waseda University in Japan. He has published many books and articles, including a single-authored book entitled Independent Success in Mayoral Elections in England: A Study of Factors Contributing to the Candidates' Success.

Contenu

1. Introduction.- 2. Overviews of Electoral Systems.- 3. Outlines of Japanese Politics.- 4. Analyses of the Homogeneous Distributions of Party Supports.- 5. Analyses of the Small Electoral Biases in Single-Member Constituencies.- 6. Analyses of the Overrepresentations of Large Parties in Proportional Representation Blocs.- 7. Analyses of the Split-Ticket Voting Forced by the Absences of Parties.- 8. Analyses of the Non-Maximisation of Seats.- 9. Illustrations of Overworking Single-Member Constituencies and Underproportionate Proportional Representation Blocs.- 10. Conclusion.