Daniel Dennett

Zusammenfassung A new title in Routledge's Major Works series, Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers, Daniel Dennett is a four-volume collection of the very best scholarship on one of the world's most influential contemporary thinkers. It is an essential work of reference destined to be valued by scholars and students as a vital one-stop resource. Inhaltsverzeichnis 80892979

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Daniel Dennett has been one of the central voices in the philosophy of mind for at least the past forty years. Unlike most philosophers of his generation, Dennett's work has resonated far and wide. It has powerfully influenced the development of cognitive science, robotics, developmental psychology, and artificial intelligence. Indeed, his work has led to many new lines of inquiry. For example, he has developed a theory of consciousness which provides an approach to naturalizing mind which circumvents many of the most significant philosophical arguments against the possibility of a scientific explanation of consciousness. The daunting quantity (and variable quality) of literature available on Dennett makes it difficult to discriminate the useful from the tendentious, superficial, and otiose. Moreover, because no comparable philosopher has had a profound impact across such a wide range of disciplines and on intellectual culture in general, responses to Dennett's philosophy are dispersed across a broad range of scientific, philosophical, and cultural domains. That is why this new title in the highly regarded Routledge series, Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers, is so urgently needed. Edited by John Symons, this new Routledge Major Work is a four-volume collection of the best scholarship on Dennett; the collected materials have been carefully selected from a wide range of academic journals, edited collections, research monographs, and other sources. The tightly focused organization of this collection allows users quickly and easily to access both established and cutting-edge assessments of Dennett's work. The set is also made for irresistible browsing. With comprehensive introductions to each volume, providing essential background information and relating the various works to each other, Daniel Dennett is destined to be an indispensable resource for research and study.

Contenu
Volume I Part 1: Critical Overviews and Introductions to Dennett's Philosophy 1. B. Dahlborn, 'Editor's Introduction', Dennett and His Critics: Demystifying Mind (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), pp. 17. 2. M. Elton, 'Dennett and the Philosophy of Mind', Daniel Dennett: Reconciling Science and our Self-Conception (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003), pp. 130. 3. P. Yu and G. Fuller, 'A Critique of Dennett', Synthese, 1986, 66, 4, 45376. 4. D. L. Thompson, 'Conclusion: Synthesis and Critical Assessment', Daniel Dennett (London: Continuum, 2009), pp. 14759. Part 2: Intentionality 5. E. N. Zalta, review of Dennett's The Intentional Stance, The Review of Metaphysics, 1989, 43, 2, 397400. 6. D. Jacquetta, review of Dennett's The Intentional Stance, Mind, 1988, XVCII, 61924. 7. P. Kitcher, review of Dennett's The Intentional Stance, The Philosophical Review, 1990, 99, 1, 1268. 8. M. R. Bennett and P. M. S. Hacker, 'Appendix 1: Daniel Dennett', Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2003), pp. 41335. 9. S. Webb, 'Witnessed Behavior and Dennett's Intentional Stance', Philosophical Topics, 2010, 22, 1/2, 45770. 10. K. Andrews, 'Our Understanding of Other Minds: Theory of Mind and the Intentional Stance', Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2000, 7, 7, 1224. 11. J. A. Fodor and E. Lepore, 'D.C. Dennett: Meaning Holism and the Normativity of Intentional Ascription (And a Little More about Davidson)', Holism: A Shopper's Guide (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), pp. 13761. 12. G. McCulloch, 'Dennett's Little Grains of Salt', The Philosophical Quarterly, 1990, 112. 13. M. Slors, 'Why Dennett Cannot Explain What it is to Adopt the Intentional Stance', The Philosophical Quarterly, 1996, 46, 182, 938. 14. M. Ratcliffe, 'A Kantian Stance on the Intentional Stance', Biology and Philosophy, 2001, 16, 1, 2952. 15. D. Beisecker, 'Dennett's Overlooked Originality', Mind and Machines, 2006, 16, 1, 4355. 16. R. G. Millikan, 'On Mentalese Orthography', in Bo Dahlborn (ed.), Dennett and His Critics: Demystifying Mind (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), pp. 97123. 17. R. G. Millikan, 'Reading Mother Nature's Mind', Varieties of Meaning: The 2002 Jean Nicod Lectures (MIT Press, 2004), pp. 97123. 18. N. Newton, 'Dennett on Intrinsic Intentionality', Analysis, 1992, 52, 1, 1823. 19. P. Cam, 'Dennett on Intelligent Storage', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 1984, 45, 2, 395430. 20. B. L. Keeley, 'Fixing Content and Function in Neurobiological Systems: The Neuroethology of Electroreception', Biology and Philosophy, 1999, 14, 3, 395430. Part 3: Mental Images and Time Perception 21. L. M. Russow, 'Dennett, Mental Images, and Images in Context', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 1985, 45, 4, 58193. 22. J. Bricke, 'Dennett's Eliminative Arguments', Philosophical Studies, 1984, 45, 3, 41329. 23. P. S. Churchland and V. S. Ramachandran, 'Filling In: Why Dennett is Wrong', in Bo Dahlborn (ed.), Dennett and His Critics: Demystifying Mind (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), pp. 2852. 24. S. J. Todd, 'A Difference That Makes a Difference: Passing Through Dennett's Stalinesque/Orwellian Impasse', The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2009, 60, 3, 497520. 25. J. Christie and J. Barresi, 'Using Illusory Line Motion to Differentiate Misrepresentation (Stalinesque) and Misremembering (Orwellian) Accounts of Consciousness', Consciousness and Cognition, 2002, 11, 2, 34765. 26. R. Roache, 'Mellor and Dennett on the Perception of Temporal Order', The Philosophical Quarterly, 2003, 49, 195, 2318. 27. G. Jarrett, 'Conspiracy Theories of Consciousness', Philosophical Studies, 1999, 96, 1, 4558. 28. P. Bloomfield, 'Dennett's Misrememberings', Philosophia, 1998, 26, 1, 20718. Volume II Part 4: Overviews of the Multiple Drafts Theory of Consciousness 29. K. Akins, 'Lost the Plot? Reconstructing Dennett's Multiple Drafts Theory of Consciousness', Mind & Language, 1996, 11, 1, 143. 30. A. Brook, 'Judgments and Drafts Eight Years Later', in Don Ross, Andrew Brook, and David Thompson (eds.), Dennett's Philosophy: A Comprehensive Assessment (MIT Press, 2000), pp. 21957. Part 5: Critical Reactions to Dennett's Theory of Consciousness 31. T. Nagel, review of Dennett's 'Content and Consciousness',The Journal of Philosophy, 1972, 69, 8, 2204. 32. R. Rorty, 'Dennett on Awareness',Philosophical Studies, 1972, 23, 3, 15362. 33. R. Rorty, 'Comments on Dennett',Synthese, 1982, 53, 2, 1817. 34. K. Gunderson, 'Content and Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem', The Journal of Philosophy, 1972, 591604. 35. R. Kirk, 'The Best Set of Tools? Dennett's Metaphors and the Mind-Body Problem',The Philosophical Quarterly, 1993, 43, 172, 33543. 36. L. R. Baker, 'Content Meets Consciousness',Philosophical Topics, 2010, 22, 1/2, 122. 37. M. Tye, 'Reflections on Dennett and Consciousness',Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 1993, 8938. 38. S. Sedivy, 'Must Conceptually Informed Perceptual Experience Involve Non-Conceptual Content?', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 1996, 26, 3, 41331. 39. S. Shoemaker, 'Lovely and Suspect Ideas', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 1993, 53, 4, 90510. 40. N. Block, review of Dennett's Consciousness Explained, Journal of Philosophy, 1993, 90, 18193. 41. C. McGinn, 'Consciousness Evaded: Comments on Dennett', Philosophical Perspectives, 1995, 9, 2419. 42. N. Block, 'What is Dennett's Theory a Theory of?', Philosophical Topics, 1994, 22, 1/2, 2340. 43. David M. Rosenthal, 'First Person Operationalism and Mental Taxonomy', Philosophical Topics, 1994, 22, 1/2, 31949. 44. D. Hutto, 'Consciousness Demystified: A Wittgensteinian Critique of Dennett's Project',The Monist, 1995, 78, …