Voting Procedures Under a Restricted Domain

This book deals with 20 voting procedures used or proposed for use in elections resulting in the choice of a single winner. These procedures are evaluated in terms of their ability to avoid five important paradoxes in a restricted domain, viz., when a Condorcet winner exists and is elected in the initial profile. Together with the two companion volumes by the same authors, published by Springer in 2017 and 2018, this book aims at giving a comprehensive overview of the most important advantages and disadvantages of voting procedures thereby assisting decision makers in the choice of a voting procedure that would best suit their purposes.

Provides an overview of 20 voting procedures used to choose a single winner Describes whether these procedures are suitable to avoid five important paradoxes in a restricted domain Serves as a companion to the 2017 and 2018 publications by Felsenthal and Nurmi (Monotonicity Failures Afflicting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate and Voting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate), both published by Springer in the same series

Auteur
Dan Felsenthal is emeritus professor of political science at the University of Haifa. Currently he is also Research Associate at the Centre for the Philosophy of Natural and Social Science, London School of Economics and Political Science. His main research areas are measurement of voting power, voting theory and voting behavior, social choice theory, and various applications of game theory to politics. He has published many papers on these subjects as well as two books: Topics in Social Choice: Sophisticated Voting, Efficacy, and Proportional Representation (New York: Praeger, 1990), and (jointly with Moshé Machover) The Measurement of Voting Power: Theory and Practice, Problems and Paradoxes (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 1998). In addition, he edited (jointly with Moshé Machover) the book Electoral Systems: Paradoxes, Assumptions, and Procedures (Berlin Heidelberg: Springer, 2012).
Hannu Nurmi was the Associate Professor of Methodology of Social Sciences in University of Turku 1974 - 1995. Thereafter he became the chair holder of Political Science in the same university until his retirement in 2012.During the academic year 1972-73 he was a Fulbright-Hayes Scholar at the Johns Hopkins University. In 1978 Nurmi held a British Academy Wolfson Fellowship at University of Essex and from 1991 till 1996 he was the Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences in University of Turku. In 1998 he was a Visiting Professor at University of Minnesota. Nurmi was nominated the Academy Professor of Academy of Finland for the period 2003-2008. He is a member of Academia Scientiarum Fennica (the Finnish Academy of Sciences and Letters) from 1982. From 2008 till 2011 he was the Director of Centre of Excellence in Public Choice Research of University of Turku. From 2012 he is Professor Emeritus in the same university. Nurmi's research interests includethe theory of voting and electoral systems, applied game theory and causal modeling.

Contenu
Introduction.- 20 Voting Procedures Designed to Elect a Single Candidate.- The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to Lack of Monotonicity in a Restricted Domain.- The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to the Inconsistency Paradox (aka Reinforcement Paradox) in a Restricted Domain.- The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to the No-Show Paradox in a Restricted Domain.- Which of the 20 Voting Procedures Satisfy or Violate the Subset Choice Condition (SCC) in a Restricted Domain?.- The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to the Preference Inversion Paradox in a Restricted Domain.- Summary.