Game Theory, Experience, Rationality

When von Neumann's and Morgenstern's Theory of Games and Economic Behavior appeared in 1944, one thought that a complete theory of strategic social behavior had appeared out of nowhere. However, game theory has, to this very day, remained a fast-growing assemblage of models which have gradually been united in a new social theory - a theory that is far from being completed even after recent advances in game theory, as evidenced by the work of the three Nobel Prize winners, John F. Nash, John C. Harsanyi, and Reinhard Selten. Two of them, Harsanyi and Selten, have contributed important articles to the present volume. This book leaves no doubt that the game-theoretical models are on the right track to becoming a respectable new theory, just like the great theories of the twentieth century originated from formerly separate models which merged in the course of decades. For social scientists, the age of great discover ies is not over. The recent advances of today's game theory surpass by far the results of traditional game theory. For example, modem game theory has a new empirical and social foundation, namely, societal experiences; this has changed its methods, its "rationality. " Morgenstern (I worked together with him for four years) dreamed of an encompassing theory of social behavior. With the inclusion of the concept of evolution in mathematical form, this dream will become true. Perhaps the new foundation will even lead to a new name, "conflict theory" instead of "game theory.

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When von Neumann's and Morgenstern's Theory of Games and Economic Behavior appeared in 1944, one thought that a complete theory of strategic social behavior had appeared out of nowhere. However, game theory has, to this very day, remained a fast-growing assemblage of models which have gradually been united in a new social theory - a theory that is far from being completed even after recent advances in game theory, as evidenced by the work of the three Nobel Prize winners, John F. Nash, John C. Harsanyi, and Reinhard Selten. Two of them, Harsanyi and Selten, have contributed important articles to the present volume. This book leaves no doubt that the game-theoretical models are on the right track to becoming a respectable new theory, just like the great theories of the twentieth century originated from formerly separate models which merged in the course of decades. For social scientists, the age of great discover ies is not over. The recent advances of today's game theory surpass by far the results of traditional game theory. For example, modem game theory has a new empirical and social foundation, namely, societal experiences; this has changed its methods, its "rationality. " Morgenstern (I worked together with him for four years) dreamed of an encompassing theory of social behavior. With the inclusion of the concept of evolution in mathematical form, this dream will become true. Perhaps the new foundation will even lead to a new name, "conflict theory" instead of "game theory.

Contenu
Articles.- Game Theory, Experience, Rationality.- Counterproductive Rationality.- Rationally Coping With Lapses From Rationality.- Do Rational People Make Mistakes?.- Rationality and Knavery.- Structural Rationality in Game Theory.- Attractions to and Repulsions From Chance.- Agreeing to Disagree: Harsanyi and Aumann.- Rethinking Rational Cooperation.- Automata and Inner States for Repeated Games.- Towards Bounded Rationality within Rational Expectations Some Comments from an Economic Point of View.- Macroeconomics and Behavioral Finance A Tale of Two Disciplines.- Bayesian Subjunctive Conditionals for Games and Decisions.- Prediction, Bayesian Deliberation and Correlated Equilibrium.- Consequentialism and Bayesian Rationality in Normal Form Games.- Game Theory, Sociodynamics, and Cultural Evolution.- Microscopic Foundation of Stochastic Game Dynamical Equations.- Uniform Barriers and Evolutionarily Stable Sets.- Equilibrium Selection via Travelling Waves.- Rational vs. Adaptive Egoism in Support Networks: How Different Micro Foundations Shape Different Macro Hypotheses.- Evolutionary Ethics.- A Preference-Based Theory of Well-Being and a Rule-Utilitarian Theory of Morality.- Variability, Uncertainty, and the Emergence of Firms and Markets.- A Game Theory of Logic A Logic of Game Theory.- Learning with Hazy Beliefs.- A Game-Theoretic Model of the War in Chechnya.- Information and Uncertainty: Power, Profits and Morality.- Report Documentation.- The Spirit of the Vienna Circle Devoted to Questions of Lebens- and Weltauffassung.- Sicher ist sicher.- Review Essay.- Scientific Emigration.- Reflections on the Austrian Knowledge Bases.- Reviews.- Hans Hahn, Collected Works, Volume 2 and 3, edited by Leopold Schmetterer and Karl Sigmund.- Kurt Gödel,Collected Works, vol.3.- John W. Dawson, Jr., Logical Dilemmas. The Life and Work of Kurt Gödel.- Bruno de Finetti, Filosofia della probabilità.- Friedrich Stadler, Studien zum Wiener Kreis.- Paolo Parrini, Conoscenza e Realtà. Saggio di filosofia positiva.- Michael Heidelberger, Die innere Seite der Natur. Gustav Theodor Fechners Wissenschaftlich philosophische Weltauffassung.- Martin Carrier, The Completeness of Scientific Theories.- Jan Faye, Niels Bohr: His Heritage and Legacy Jan Faye, Henry J. Folse (eds.), Niels Bohr and Contemporary Philosophy.- Christian Thiel, Philosophie und Mathematik.- Jesus Padilla Gálvez (ed.), El Cìrculo de Viena, Reconsiderado.- Kurt Blaukopf, Pioniere empiristischer Musikforschung.- Kurt Blaukopf (Ed.), Philosophie, Literatur und Musik im Orchester der Wissenschaften.- Hans Sluga/David G. Stern (Eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein.- Activities of the Institute Vienna Circle.- Survey 1997.- Preview 1998.- Index of Names.