American and Canadian Counterinsurgency Strategies in Afghanistan

The book aims to explain the factors that brought about a high degree of similarity between American and Canadian foreign and security policies during the Afghanistan intervention. Specifically, it seeks to explain why, despite their different positions in the international distribution of power, the United States and Canada embraced similar counterinsurgency (COIN) strategies from 2005/2006 to 2011. During this time, the United States and Canada fought against insurgent groups, sought to maintain stabilized areas by mentoring Afghan forces, and invested in infrastructure and governance. These goals, which corresponded to the 'clear,' 'hold,' and 'build' COIN components, entailed sending troops and civilian officials to a war zone and committing financial resources.

Examines a critical case of Canadian foreign and security policy in Afghanistan Challenges the bandwagon-effect, military-ascendency and compensation theses Explains why and how states differently placed in the international system end up behaving similarly

Auteur

Federman Rodriguez is Assistant Professor of the Faculty of International Relations, Political and Urban Studies at Rosario University, Bogotá, Colombia.

Contenu

1. Introduction.- 2. Countries with Different Material Capabilities Behaving Similarly.- 3. Unipolarity and Irregular Warfare: Assessing the Afghanistan Intervention's Strategic Environment.- 4. American and Canadian Security Beliefs: Transitioning to Similar Foreign and Security Policies during the Afghanistan Intervention.- 5. Domestic Hurdles, Canadian and American Foreign Policy Executives(FPEs)' Structural Autonomy and Resource-Extraction Capability.- 6. Conclusion: Unravelling the Research Puzzle.