Moral Judgement

Auteur

Étienne Brown is a Postdoctoral fellow at the Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics whose research is currently supported by Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. He holds a Ph.D. from the Sorbonne and has held visiting appointments at the University of Pittsburgh and the Humboldt-Universität in Berlin.

Texte du rabat

This book integrates Kantian and Aristotelian reflections on the nature and justification of moral judgements. Arguing that moral judgements are ultimately grounded in the normativity of practical identities, the book concludes that it is through obligations tied to our multifaceted identities that we can ultimately understand how we ought to act.

Contenu

Introduction

Part I. The Neo-Aristotelian Critique of Kantian Judgement

Chapter 1. Moral Judgement in An Aristotelian Communitarian Perspective

Chapter 2. German Neo-Aristotelianism and the Normativity of Ethos

Chapter 3. A French Aristotelian Perspective on Deliberation

Part II. Three Perspectives on the Foundations of Moral Judgement

Chapter 4. Habermassian Discourse Ethics and the Grounds of Moral Judgement

Chapter 5. Kantian Constructivism and the Normativity of Practical Identities

Chapter 6. Contemporary Aristotelianism and the Normativity of Nature

Part III. Principles, Skills and Actions

Chapter 7. From Principles to Actions

Chapter 8. Kantian Virtues

(A Merleau-Pontian) Conclusion