Experts, Social Scientists, and Techniques of Prognosis in Cold War America

This book describes how Cold War researchers used expert opinions to construct foreknowledge of geopolitical relevance. Focusing on the RAND Corporation, an American think tank with close relations to the armed forces, Dayé analyses the development of two techniques of prognosis, the Delphi technique and Political Gaming.

Based on archival research and interviews, the chapters explore the history of this series of experiments to understand how contemporary social scientists conceived of one of the core categories of the Cold War, the expert, and uncover the systematic use of expert opinions to craft prognoses.

This consideration of the expert's role in Cold War society and what that can tell us about the role of the expert today will be of interest to students and scholars across the history of science, the sociology of knowledge, future studies, the history of the Cold War, social science methodology, and social policy.

Counters the emphasis on theory in the historiography of the social sciences and seeks to establish new interest in the history of empirical social research Suggests that epistemic hopes describe a social mechanism wherein the wish to do something good causes something bad: the adoption and maintenance of a non-optimal technique Steps back from policy analysis to focus on how expert knowledge is actually produced, offering a unique assessment of tacit assumptions and methodological inconsistencies

Auteur

Christian Dayé is Research Fellow at the Science, Technology and Society (STS) Unit of Graz University of Technology, Austria.

Résumé

"In the future, historians of social science would be wise to follow Dayé's recommendation to focus more of their work on explicating the historical embeddedness of research methods and techniques. Doing so will not only help us understand the latter on their own terms, but will also provide insight into the important role epistemology plays in shaping Americans' approach to the world." (Daniel Bessner, Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, July 23, 2021)

Contenu

1. Introduction: A Culture of Insecurity and its Experts.- 2. Experts, Think Tanks, and the Delicate Balance of Public Trust. - 3. The Wisdom of the Group: RAND's First Experiments with Expert Prediction, 1947-1951.- 4. Negotiating Rules for the Game: Political Games at RAND, 1954-1956.- 5. The Oracle's Epistemology: Expert Opinions as Scientific Material.- 6.The Boredom of the Crowd: The Long-Range Forecasting Delphi, 1963-1964.- 7. Conclusion: The Strength of Epistemic Hopes.