What's Wrong with Lookism?

Auteur

Andrew Mason is Professor of Political Theory in the Department of Politics and International Studies at the University of Warwick. He has also held posts at the Universities of St Andrews, Oxford, Hull, Reading, and Southampton, and visiting fellowships at the European University Institute, KU Leuven, Goethe University Frankfurt, and Aarhus University. He is the author of several books, including Living Together as Equals (OUP, 2012), Levelling the Playing Field (OUP, 2006), and Community, Solidarity and Belonging (CUP, 2000).

Texte du rabat

What is wrong with discriminating on the basis of personal appearance? Andrew Mason considers this question in three contents: employment decisions; the choice of friends or romantic partners; and the everyday practice of judging and commenting upon people's looks.

Résumé
People are treated differently as a result of their looks. But when is appearance discrimination, or "lookism" as it is often called, morally objectionable? This issue is important for at least two reasons. First, the benefits that flow to people who are regarded as visually attractive are sizeable and are enjoyed in a number of contexts, including employment, personal relationships, education, politics, and the criminal justice system. Second, appearance discrimination is of moral interest not only in its own right, but also in terms of its connection to other forms of discrimination. Appearance norms, that is, norms concerning how we should look, often place greater burdens on disadvantaged groups. As a result, discrimination on the basis of appearance, when it rewards people who conform to these norms, may involve, or interact with, the effects of, wrongful discrimination on the basis of features other than appearance, in a way that aggravates existing injustices. What's Wrong with Lookism? examines the morality of appearance discrimination in three contexts: employment decisions; the choice of friends or romantic partners; and the everyday practice of judging and commenting upon people's looks. Andrew Mason develops a pluralist theory of what makes discrimination wrong that identifies three wrong-making features, namely, disrespect, deliberative unfairness, and contributing to unjust consequences, and demonstrates how the presence of one or more of these features in each of these contexts problematises the lookism that takes place in it.

Contenu

• 1: Introduction

• Part One What Makes Discrimination Wrong?

• 2: Non-contingent wrongness

• 3: Contingent wrongness

• PART II Contexts of Appearance Discrimination

• 4: Appearance, race, and employment

• 5: Appearance as a reaction qualification

• 6: Appearance and personal relationships

• 7: Everyday lookism

• Part Three Responding to Appearance Discrimination

• 8: Prevention

• 9: Compensation and beyond

• Bibliography